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Using Norwegian administrative household panel data from 2009-16, we investigate the 
effects of wealth taxation on taxable wealth. The wealth tax reform of 2014-15 offers a 
compelling quasi-experiment, which enables us to isolate the tax rate variations of the 
households. We estimate the net-of-tax rate elasticity of taxable wealth to be 2.24 in 
aggregate, using a Difference-in-Difference framework. Compared to existing studies from 
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The distortionary effects of wealth taxation on savings and wealth accumulation is a question 
that has been receiving growing attention in academia. Quantifying behavioral responses to 
wealth taxation is crucial in determining optimal taxation policies (Saez and Stantcheva 2018) 
— especially considering that today's wealth-income ratios appear to return to the high values 
of the 18th century (Piketty and Zucman 2014). The dispersion in wealth distribution and 
increases in wealth inequality further fuels the motivation to research the topic. In the 18th 
century, in countries like France, Great Britain, and Sweden, the top 10-group in the wealth 
distribution possessed roughly 80-90 percent of all the private assets. This share declined 
sharply in the 19th century until 1970, where the concentration seemed to increase again 
(Piketty 2014). Considering that income from capital is not as evenly distributed as labor 
income, optimal taxation policies are paramount. Governments seek a perfect balance; 
significant inequality in wealth distribution is undesirable. At the same time, taxes that are too 
high might motivate individuals to emigrate or evade their wealth into tax havens, leaving the 
country with less tax revenues. Even though the possibilities are limited for the general 
population, they are more available for the wealthiest because of an industry designed to help 
this small group (Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman 2019a).  
 
Over the last three decades, the international trend has been to reduce and remove wealth 
taxation. In 1990, 12 European countries had an annual wealth tax. In 2019 this number was 
down to three: Norway, Spain, and Switzerland (Edwards 2019). In Norway, the wealth tax 
debate became especially prominent when Solberg and Høyre, in the 2013 election campaign, 
advertised a massive reduction in the wealth tax. The polarization between the left- and right-
wing of the political spectrum grew. The left side argues that wealth tax is a fair and effective 
way to reduce inequality (Arbeiderpartiet 2021; SV 2021; Rødt 2021). The right side argues 
that the potential distortions of investments and savings are harmful to Norwegian ownership 
(Høyre 2021; FrP 2021). 
 
There is a long-standing ambiguity of the savings response to rate-of-return shocks induced 
by wealth taxation. This is due to the countering income and substitution effects (Zoutman 
2015; Ring 2020). Taxes reduce the return on savings. If this leads to the individual's required 
rate of return not being met, they might substitute savings by consumption today; the so-
called substitution effect. The income effect works in the opposite direction; individuals 
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might be motivated to save in order to maintain future consumption since taxes erode future 
returns (NOU 2018:5). Potential data limitations make it difficult to separate real saving 
responses from tax evasion. It is also difficult to find compelling variations in the wealth tax 
that allow estimating causal effects. When assessing the desirability of the wealth tax, 
policymakers are primarily interested in the long-run effect. Due to the slow-moving nature of 
wealth, this has shown to be challenging (Ring 2020; Jakobsen, Jakobsen, Kleven, and 
Zucman 2020).  
 
Studies report that an increase in wealth tax reduces taxable wealth. Their estimates mainly 
signal changes in reporting behavior, inter-regional migration, or tax avoidance by placing 
capital in favorable assets (Zoutman 2018; Seim 2017; Brülhart, Gruber, Krapf, and 
Schmidheiny 2019; Jakobsen et al. 2020; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 
2019; Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 2019; Agrawal, Foremny, and Martínez-Toledan 
2021). However, Ring (2020), when limiting the roles of evasion, finds that households 
increase savings when subjected to wealth taxation. An indication that the income effect 
possibly outweighs the substitution effect; households presumably save to meet future tax 
liabilities. His findings are partially substantiated by Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-
Montserrat (2019), who find slightly positive saving responses when filtering out tax 
avoidance and mechanical effects. 
 
In this master thesis, we aim to contribute to the existing empirical research on the elasticity 
of taxable wealth – especially since there has only been one Norwegian contribution (Ring 
2020). The government levies wealth tax on households with wealth net of debt above the 
threshold of each year’s specific tax assessment rules. We have panel data of the Norwegians 
household's tax returns from 2009-16. The panel structure enables us to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity between the households. During the first half of this period, the tax 
authorities increased the wealth tax liability for the wealthy through a higher valuation of 
assets, especially primary and secondary housing. The second half is characterized by tax rate 
reliefs and significant increases in the yearly thresholds. The tax reform of 2014-15 provided 
a great relief in the tax rate and a substantial increase in the threshold. The tax authorities 
reduced the rate from 1 to 0.85 percent, increased the threshold from 1 to 1.2 mNOK, and 
some various valuation rules changes. We utilize this reform to isolate the wealth tax 
variation for the households. The preferred method is a Difference-in-Difference estimator. 
This enables us to regress households' wealth on their tax rate changes and capture the 
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potential distortionary effect of wealth taxation. The tax rate changes of the households are 
heterogeneous, and they constitute a continuous treatment variable, with the run-of-the-mill 
control group receiving zero change. 
 
The tax rate changes a household could experience in the reform are directly linked to wealth 
development from 2014 to 2015. Exogenous shocks to the household’s wealth might affect 
whether the household experience a changed tax rate. This would entail a correlation between 
the unobserved determinant of wealth and the tax rate change. This is a case of reverse 
causality and would be detrimental in the interference of causal effects. In the spirit of Gruber 
and Saez (2002), we overcome these potential endogeneity problems by constructing an 
instrument for the counterfactual wealth tax change. We keep the behavior of the household 
constant by implementing the 2015 tax system on the 2014 assets, and after that, calculating 
the tax rate change from 2014 to the 2015 tax system. This is our identification strategy; it 
relies on the notion that it is solely the changed tax environment that changes the household's 
tax rate. Because of this strategy, the instrument is plausibly exogenous. The method enables 
us to estimate the net-of-tax rate elasticity of taxable wealth, which measures how sensitive 
wealth is to a 1 percentage increase in the net-of-tax rate.1 
 
Our research question is as follows: 
 
What is the elasticity of taxable wealth? 
 
Based on existing empirical studies, we expect to find a negative relationship between an 
increase in the tax rate and taxable wealth, i.e., a positive net-of-tax rate elasticity. Moreover, 
based on the favorable tax policy changes of the 2014-15 reform, we assume that savings and 
wealth accumulation became more desirable than before.  
 
We divide the thesis into 8 chapters. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework and offers 
reviews of existing studies. Chapter 3 describes the data set used in the analysis. Chapter 4 
presents the methodology. Chapter 5 provides a descriptive overview of the data with 
statistics on the whole data sample and treatment and control groups. Chapter 6 contains the 
results, discussion, comparison to other studies, and robustness check. Chapter 7 accounts for 
potential limitations. Chapter 8 contains our conclusion based on the conducted research.     
 
1 A percentage increase in the net-of-tax rate (1-T), i.e., the share of wealth kept by an individual after tax. 
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2 Theoretical Framework  
This chapter intends to give a deeper understanding of the Norwegian taxation of wealth and 
offers information on the institutional setting. Since we are using the reform of 2014-15 to 
isolate the wealth tax variation of the households, it is of particular interest to examine the 
changes made by the policymakers. We will also review recent research on the impact of 
wealth tax on savings and wealth. 
 
2.1 Institutional Setting 
Chapter 4. in the Taxation Act regulates the Norwegian wealth tax.2 The main rule of the act 
cf. section 4-1 (1) defines how the individual's taxable wealth is determined. The law states 
that the "taxable wealth shall be calculated as the sales value as of 1 January of the tax 
assessment year of any assets of the taxpayer that are of economic value, less any debts for 
which the taxpayer is liable."3 Section 2-1 (7) states that "the liability to pay net wealth tax is 
conditional upon the taxpayer being a resident in Norway on 1 January of the year in which 
the tax is assessed.”  
 
The government levies wealth tax only on individuals; limited liability companies and 
publicly listed companies are exempt from this liability (Olsen and Vigdal 2018). The tax 
applies to all wealth of the Norwegian resident, regardless of whether the individuals choose 
to invest in foreign assets. The wealth tax is divided into two parts: one goes to the state, and 
the other goes to the municipality. The Norwegian Parliament yearly revises the tax rate and 
the valuation rules, and they determine the maximum rates for the municipalities. The 
municipality has autonomy over its part of the tax rate. In practice, the municipalities tax 
wealth with the highest possible rate given the current legislation (Zimmer 2012).  
 
Table 1 below presents the various tax rates, thresholds, and the tax value of different asset 
classes from 2005-21. For spouses who are assessed jointly on their wealth, the threshold is 
twice as large.4 Both single taxpayers and spouses with taxable wealth below the year-specific 
activation threshold will not face wealth tax obligations. Wealth above the threshold is taxed 
 
2 We have used an unofficial translation of the Act of 26 March 1999 No. 14 relating to the Taxation of Net 
Wealth and Income (Taxation Act), made by PwC. Last updated on December 20, 2020. 
https://min.rettsdata.no/Dokument/gLENG19990326z2D14 
3 The value of debt, like wealth, is calculated as at the value of January 1. 
4 Doubling of the threshold was introduced in 2006. 
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at the rate of the corresponding year. Assets included in the tax assessment are, for example, 
primary housing, company shares (listed and unlisted), secondary homes, leisure homes, 
commercial real estate, cash, and intangible assets. Aggregated debt is deducted on the value 
of gross wealth, not only debts for which the taxpayer's items are pledged. Meaning, all debt 
is deductible, including student loans and consumer loans.5 It is irrelevant whether the debt 
carries an interest obligation. Wealth and debts located in Norway are mainly third-party 
reported, while wealth held abroad is primarily self-reported (Skatteetaten(b) n.d.).  
 
The tax value of different assets varies, and the tax system offers significant tax rebates of 
some assets, especially primary housing. Taxation Act section 4-19 (1) a) states that if an 
individual has assets subjected to valuation rebate, there shall be a similar rebate in the value 
of debt associated with these assets. The section excludes primary homes, but it includes 
secondary homes and commercial real estate. Households with wealth mainly in primary 
housing will often have low or negative taxable wealth due to the deductibility of debt at 
market value.  
 
Section 4-12 in the Taxation Act regulates the tax value of shares in listed and non-listed 
companies. The government offered substantial relief in the tax assessment value of these 
assets from 2017. The Ministry of Finance (2015) proposed that this would equalize the 
distortionary effect of asymmetric tax valuation of assets and motivate value-added 
investments. The market value of listed shares is found on the last trading day prior to the tax 
assessment year. The tax value of non-listed shares is found on January 1, the year before the 
tax assessment year. Cf. section 4-12 (2) the tax value of a non-listed share is “the proportion 
of total tax value of the private limited company as of January 1 the year before the tax 
assessment year attributable to each share, on the basis of the nominal value of such a share.”6 
Investing in non-listed shares is a popular tax avoidance strategy because they are valued at 
book value, while listed shares are valued at market value. Bjørneby, Markussen, and Røed 
(2020) show that firm-owners reduce their taxable wealth by investing in human capital 
because it does not show up on the firm's balance sheet. Globel and Hestdal (2015) estimate 
 
5 There are some exceptions. See chapter 4. section 4-3 in the Taxation Act. 
6 Cf. Taxation Act section 4-13 (1): if in the year before the tax assessment year a capital increase has been 
made, or a reduction, then there would be an exception from this rule. As listed companies, one will value the 
share of ownership in a private limited company at as 1 January in the tax assessment year. 
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that the average tax valuation rebate for non-listed firms traded at the Norwegian OTC-list is 
68.1 percent, making them lucrative as a tax avoidance vehicle.7  
 
The wealth tax system has undergone two distinct waves of reforms in the last 16 years. The 
period 2005-11 brought increases in the wealth tax liability for the wealthy through increases 
in the valuation of housing, listed/non-listed shares, and business assets. Before the tax reform 
of 2009-10, housing's tax valuation was based on historical cost, with an annual adjustment 
from the previous years' tax value (Bjørneby, Markussen, and Røed 2020). This valuation 
method led to a greater difference between real wealth and taxable wealth, mostly since older 
housing was undervalued relative to newer housing. This was why the government changed it 
to estimated sales value based on comparable housing in the same geographical area from 
2010 and onward (Ministry of Finance 2009).8 During 2013-17, the government gave 
significant reliefs in the tax rate. Furthermore, they reduced the number of households liable 
to the tax by a more substantial annual increase in the threshold than before. These changes 





















7The OTC-list (over-the-counter) is a marketplace for non-listed shares. Their tax value is according to book 
value, but they are traded at market value. This enabled Hestdal and Globel (2015) to estimate the average 
rebate. 
8 The estimated sales value shall be “calculated by multiplying the square meter area of the residence by a square 
meter rate,” cf. Taxation Act 4-10 (4). The square meter rate is set by Statistics Norway. 
From the tax year 2021, according to section 4-10 (1), the value of real estate may be put below its estimated 
sales value. This means that the taxpayer can demand that primary and leisure homes' tax value be reduced to the 
real market value (documented sales value) instead of estimated sales value. The same applies to the tax value of 
secondary homes and commercial real estate (Skatteetaten(a) n.d; Taxation Act section 4-10 (2), (3) and (4)). 
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Table 1: Wealth Tax Rates, Thresholds, and Valuation Rules 
 
Source: Bjørneby, Markussen, and Røed (2020) with the extension of the tax assessment year 2021 (Ministry of Finance 
2020b). The box highlights the various valuation rules in our sample period.  
  
2.1.1 Wealth Tax Reform of 2014-15 
We base our analysis on the tax variation which the reform of 2014-15 offers. The identifying 
variation in the household’s wealth tax rate comes from the tax rate change in the turn of 
2014-15. The policymakers changed the tax rate from 1 to 0.85 percent, and they increased 
the threshold from 1 mNOK to 1.2 mNOK. They further kept the valuation of primary 
housing unchanged but induced a 10-percentage point increase in the tax valuation of 
secondary homes and business properties. The Ministry of Finance (2014) proposed the 
wealth tax changes to the Norwegian Parliament on the basis that it would give stronger 
incentives to save. They argued that the increased threshold would further motivate 
households close to the previous thresholds to save. At the same time, offering incentives to 
households above the threshold by reducing the rate.  
 
While the wealth tax unambiguously reduces the return of the various assets, the reform of 
2014-15 offered an increase in the after-tax return due to lesser tax liability. The increase was 
 
Tax rates and thresholds 
Tax valuation of assets 
PY: % adjustment from previous year’s tax assessment value 






























2005    0.9 151 000 1.1 540 000 PY: 0 PY: 0 PY: 0 PY: 0 MV: 65 
2006 0.9 200 000 1.1 540 000 PY: 25 PY: 25 PY: 25 PY: 25 MV: 80 
2007 0.9 220 000 1.1 540 000 PY: 10 PY: 10 PY: 10 PY: 10 MV: 85 
2008 0.9 350 000 1.1 540 000 PY: 10 PY: 10 PY: 10 PY: 10 MV: 100 
2009 1.1 470 000  PY: 10 PY: 10 PY: 10 PY:60/MV:40 MV: 100 
2010 1.1 700 000 MV: 25 PY: 10 MV: 40 MV: 40 MV: 100 
2011 1.1 700 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 40 MV: 40 MV: 100 
2012 1.1 750 000 MV: 25 PY: 10 MV: 40 MV: 40 MV: 100 
2013 1.1 870 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 50 MV: 50 MV: 100 
2014 1 1 000 000 MV: 25 PY: 10 MV: 60 MV: 60 MV: 100 
2015 0.85 1 200 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 70 MV: 70 MV: 100 
2016 0.85 1 400 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 80 MV: 80 MV: 100 
2017 0.85 1 480 000  MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 90 MV: 80 MV: 90 
2018 0.85 1 480 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 90 MV: 80 MV: 80 
2019 0.85 1 500 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 90 MV: 75 MV: 75 
2020 0.85 1 500 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 90 MV: 65 MV: 65 
2021 0.85 1 500 000 MV: 25 PY: 0 MV: 90 MV: 65 MV: 55 
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applicable for all households above the threshold, including individuals with most of their 
wealth in secondary housing and business assets. However, their tax relief was not as 
significant as households with all wealth in primary housing. 
 
The reform of 2014-15 enables us to isolate all the changes made to the wealth tax system, 
including rates, thresholds, and tax valuation of assets. The reform offers four variations in 
the household’s tax rate; it can be constant at 0, households are below the threshold both in 
2014 and 2015. Their rate can be changed from 1 to 0.85 percent if they are above both 
thresholds. The rate can also be reduced from 1 percent to 0, if they exceed the 2014 but not 
the 2015 threshold. Lastly, the rate can be increased from 0 to 0.85 percent if they are below 
the 2014 but exceeds the 2015 threshold. With such a reform, we can separate a treatment and 
control group. The treatment group receives one of the tax rate changes, while the control 
group receives zero change, they are below both the 2014 and 2015 threshold.  
 
2.2 The Basis of the Wealth Tax Policy 
The primary purpose of the Norwegian wealth tax is the redistribution effect and the public 
sector’s need for tax revenue (NOU 2009:10). Wealth is unequally distributed in the 
population and much more concentrated than income. In a study of inequality, Piketty and 
Saez (2014) show that in the US, the top 10 percent in the income distribution owned almost 
45 percent of the total pre-tax income in 2010. Simultaneously, the top 10 group in the wealth 
distribution owned around 70 percent of the total wealth. The numbers from Norway are not 
as extreme. Statistics Norway (2021a) estimate that the top 10 group in the wealth distribution 
owns approximately 53.5 percent of the total Norwegian wealth.  
 
The Norwegian tax system is dual, labor income is taxed progressively, and capital income is 
taxed at a flat rate, respectively, at 46.4 (maximum) and 22 percent in 2021.9 In this system, 
an individual with most of her income coming from capital ownership effectively has a lower 
average tax than a high-income worker. The wealth tax acts as a mechanism in ensuring that 
the progressive tax system is maintained. Another justification for the tax is the benefits that a 
more considerable fortune provides, especially non-economic benefits such as the opportunity 
 
9 Dividends are multiplied by an adjustment factor of 1.44, as of the tax year 2021; thus, the effective tax rate is 
31.68 percent. If one additionally accounts for corporate tax, the effective tax on dividends becomes 46.7 percent 
(Ministry of Finance 2020b). 
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to own works of art, social status, power, and influence. An additional function is to provide 
relief to other taxes and distribute taxes on several bases (NOU 2018:5).  
 
Tax as the Share of Gross Income. 2018. 
         A. Top 1 percent in the wealth distribution     
                           divided into 10 deciles                     B.  Sorted by intervals of income 
 
Figure 1: Tax as the fraction of gross income in 2018. Red: wealth tax. Blue: income tax. Numbers in thousands NOK. 
Source: The Ministry of Finance (2020a). 
 
Figure 1B indicates that the tax system becomes regressive without the wealth tax when the 
individual’s income exceeds 3 mNOK. This non-progressivity occurs in particular because of 
the very definition of income. With income from labor, the tax rate structure ensures 
progressivity.10 However, once you include income from capital holdings and sole 
proprietorships, and add personal deductions, a non-progressiveness emerges at the top 
income distribution (NOU 2014:13). Moreover, when matching leaked customer lists from 
tax havens with wealth records in Scandinavia, Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2019a) 
finds that the wealthiest 0.01 percent approximately evades 25 percent of their taxes. 
Indicating that the tax system is even more regressive when including tax evasion. As figure 
1A suggests, the wealth tax constitutes close to half of the taxes relative to gross income for 
the tenth decile. Without wealth tax, this group pays the same share of tax to gross income as 
the group with an income of 750-1000 kNOK (figure 1B). A clear indication that wealth 




10The bracket tax on income is additional taxes on higher income levels. The maximum effective tax rate of labor 
income is 46.4 percent in 2021 (Ministry of Finance 2020b). 
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Aaberge, Modalsli, and Vestad (2020) supplement the official income statistics11 with 
company profits not paid as dividends to get a better picture of income inequality. They show 
that labor income in the top 98 percentile in the income distribution constitutes only 32 
percent of the firm owner's total income. Simultaneously, the top 1 percent pays on average 
19.8 percent in taxes, a low number comparing to the median, where the average tax is 22.1 
percent.12 These findings substantiate the arguments of having a corrective tax, like the wealth 
tax, to ensure progressivity. Arguably, to include company profits not paid as dividends as 
real income of the taxpayer is controversial. However, as Aaberge discusses in an interview in 
Forskning.no (Amundsen 2020), a wealthy individual may use their companies as personal 
saving vehicles and withdraw capital when the tax system favors it.13 
 
In a recent Norwegian study by Lian, Nesbakken, Jia, Nygård, and Vattø (2019), using data 
from 2013 to 2019, they investigate how changes in the taxation of wealth and income affect 
redistribution. Measuring the tax relief relative to disposable income, they find the 
beneficiaries of a reduction in the wealth tax are primarily individuals with low income and 
relatively big fortune. This group consists of pensioners, business owners, and workers. An 
important reason for this pattern is that people might have low income due to losses in the 
capital market or their businesses. When they rank according to wealth, as opposed to income, 
the top 1 percent has the most significant relief relative to disposable income. They conclude 
that there was a slight increase in income inequality from 2013 till 2019. Still, little of this 
effect is attributable to the reduction in wealth taxation, primarily due to the wealth tax relief 
for the proportion of wealthy individuals with low income. They make the case that the 
Norwegian tax system has become moderately less redistributive from 2013 till 2019, and the 
main reason is the reduction in the base rate of income tax.14 
 
As figure 1 suggests, the wealth tax works as a mechanism to maintain the progressive tax 
structure and raise the average tax for high-income individuals. Figure 2 indicates that the 
proportion of those levied wealth tax has decreased from 1998 till 2020 due to the continuous 
 
11 Income stated in the individual tax returns. 
12 2018 numbers. 
13 Aaberge, Modalsli, and Vestad (2020) showed that the dividend payouts increased rapidly when the dividend 
tax to be implemented in 2006 was announced in 2004. Right before 2006, the dividend payout decreased 
sharply.  
14 Base tax rate of income was gradually reduced from 28% to 22% over the sample period. Bracket tax and 
National Insurance contributions are added to this. 
 
11 
increases in the threshold. Naturally, the average payments increase mechanically because of 
this. In addition, various rule changes during the period might affect the average payments. 
The figure shows that the wealth tax liability concentrates on a small proportion of wealthy 
individuals in the later years, which effectively increases their average tax and ensures 
progressivity. 
 
The Proportion Levied Wealth Tax and the Average Payments 
 
Figure 2: NOK-2020 prices. Red line: average wealth tax payments. Columns: the proportion of the Norwegian population 
who pay wealth tax. Source: The Ministry of Finance (2020a) p.58. 
 
2.3 Distortion of Savings and Investments 
All personal capital taxes are assumed to affect an individual's saving behavior. However, the 
impact of an increase in the rate of return on savings is ambiguous because of countering 
income and substitutions effects (Zoutman 2015; Ring 2020).  
 
The substitution effect ensures that saving increases because the price of future consumption 
relative to current consumption decreases (Zoutman 2015). An individual chooses to save and 
delay consumption if the financial gains by saving exceed their required rate of return. If there 
is a reduction in the wealth tax, then the after-tax return increases, which leads to saving 
becoming more lucrative. This ensures that individuals choose to delay consumption and save 
more. However, the substitution effect depends on the behavior adjustments that follow due to 
changes in an individual’s overall spending opportunities. The countering income effect 
(wealth effect) goes in the opposite direction. If the individual's after-tax return on savings 
increases, the individual may perceive that they are wealthier. Since future returns increase, 
individuals do not have to save as much to maintain future consumption (NOU 2018:5). This 
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might influence whether individuals choose to consume more today. Especially, a perceived 
increase in wealth may move consumption from normal goods to more lucrative goods, which 
leads to a reduction in capital available for savings. In the opposite direction, if the after-tax 
return decreases because of an increasing wealth tax, this can motivate individuals to save to 
maintain the level of future consumption. 
 
One of the several arguments of why countries have chosen to abolish the wealth tax was that 
it was assumed to inhibit savings and investment, and therefore, economic growth (Edwards 
2019). However, while most studies show that an increase in the wealth tax reduces taxable 
wealth, the real saving responses are unclear. Mainly because the estimates point towards 
changes in reporting behavior, tax avoidance, or evasion (Zoutman 2018; Seim 2017; Brülhart 
et al. 2019; Jakobsen et al. 2020; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-Montserrat 2019; 
Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 2019; Agrawal, Foremny and Martínez-Toledan 2021). 
The empirical evidence of real saving responses shows weak results. Seim (2017) estimates 
saving responses but finds insignificant effects, and his overall findings primarily point 
towards changes in reporting behavior. Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 
(2019) estimate point towards a reduction in taxable wealth by an increase in the wealth tax, 
which indicates avoidance with business assets as the primary vehicle. However, when 
limiting avoidance opportunities and filtering out mechanical effects, they find a slightly 
positive relationship between savings and the wealth tax. This substantiates the findings of 
Ring (2020), who shows that in Norway, presumably, the income effects dominate the 
substitution effect. Households increase their savings when faced with the wealth tax liability, 
detailed in section 2.4. 
 
These contradicting saving responses directly relate to the research question; we are interested 
in quantifying the behavioral responses to wealth taxation. However, we cannot separate real 
saving responses from avoidance or evasion, but we have somewhat limited the scope of 
evasion. We will further discuss these various findings in more detail in section 2.4.  
 
2.3.1 Effective Tax Rates on Returns  
The asymmetry of various valuation rules might lead to different after-tax returns of financial 
assets and distort saving behavior. The OECD economic survey of Norway (2012) presents 
effective tax calculations from the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. They calculate effective 
tax rates on real income from different assets using 4 percent return and 2 percent inflation. In 
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2012 the Norwegian wealth tax was 1.1 percent, and the ordinary tax rate was 28 percent. 
Primary residence and rental housing had tax advantages with rebates in the market value of 
85 and 60 percent, respectively. At the same time, bank deposits and shares had zero rebates.  
 
The calculations with and without wealth tax are shown in table 2. The tax system favors 
primary residence, with an effective tax rate of 14 percent, compared to shares and interest-
bearing accounts, with an effective tax rate of 113 percent. In addition, it is easy to credit-
finance housing, and debt is deductible at market value when determining taxable wealth. 
This provides significant incentives to turn investments towards primary residences. As 
discussed in NOU (2014:13), the tax system favoring of housing might lead to a loss to 
society because of housing's financial unproductiveness. Households might accumulate 
wealth in heavy rebated assets, which they consider a tax system weakness. The OECD 
(2019) survey of Norway argues that a more uniform valuation method should be considered 
as differences in asset valuation distort investment decisions. 
 
Table 2: Effective Tax Rates 
 
Effective tax rates on real income from different assets. Example calculation rental housing with a market value of 100 NOK:  
4 NOK return à 1.12 (4*28%) ordinary tax + 0.44 (100*40%*1.1%) wealth tax = 1,56 in total tax. When accounting for 
inflation, the real return is 2 NOK. Effective tax rate is 79% (1.56/2). Source: OECD (2012).  
 
2.4 Empirical Evidence of the Effect of Wealth Tax on Taxable Wealth 
Our question of interest in this thesis is the causal effect of wealth tax on taxable wealth. 
There is extensive research on the elasticity of taxable income; however, the elasticity of 
taxable wealth has not been under the same scrutiny. Nevertheless, quite a bit of recent 
empirical research has highlighted the question. It is a question of great political interest and 
importance when determining optimal taxation policies. As mentioned previously, there is an 
ambiguity about the saving responses to an increase in the after-tax return due to countering 
income and substitution effects (Zoutman 2015; Ring 2020). This ambiguity further motivates 
research on the topic to provide policymakers with tangible empirical evidence. Empirical 
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studies on wealth tax are challenging. Jakobsen et al. (2020) highlight that we are primarily 
interested in the long-run effect when working empirically with taxation policy. It is easier to 
work with labor taxes than wealth taxes due to the slow nature of wealth accumulation. 
Additionally, few countries have data on individuals' wealth, and finding wealth tax variation 
that allows for estimating causal effects is difficult (Jakobsen et al. 2020). Despite these 
challenges, researchers are studying the effect of wealth taxation on wealth accumulation in 
various countries.  
 
Using administrative household data from 1995-04 in the Netherlands, Zoutman (2018) 
estimates that a 0.1 percentage-point increase in the Dutch wealth tax, which was 1.2 percent, 
reduces household savings by 1.38 percent after 4 years. He expresses that this response is 
likely to be changes in reporting behavior. His findings are in the middle of two existing 
studies. Seim (2017), using administrative records from 2000-06 in Sweden and employing a 
bunching strategy, estimates the net-of-tax rate elasticity15 in the range of 0.09-0.27. By the 
properties of logarithms, we can approximate a reduction in wealth by an 0.1 percentage point 
increase in the tax rate to be 0.027 percent, using the upper bounds of his estimates.16 He 
highlights that about one-third of these elasticity estimates are due to underreported asset 
values. Further, he discusses that, though small, his estimates point toward evasion rather than 
real saving responses. According to Seim (2017), one reason is that the Swedish tax system 
has advantages for different assets and that the system is full of loopholes and insufficient 
enforcement.  
 
Brülhart et al. (2019), study how households respond to wealth taxation in Switzerland, where 
the wealth tax is raised at a cantonal17 level with no federal interference. This enables them to 
estimate the aggregate responses, considering the rich variation of wealth tax policies and 
wealth in each canton from 2003-15. They find that a 0.1 percentage point increase in the 
wealth tax rate reduces reported wealth by 4.11 percent after 4 years. There is, indeed, 
significant variation between these three findings. However, as Advani and Tarrant (2020) 
highlight, bunching techniques normally exploit an individuals' motivation to aim their wealth 
 
15 A percentage increase in the net-of-tax rate (1-T), the share of wealth kept by an individual after tax. 
16 Seim estimates are not entirely comparable to Zoutman, because he estimates the elasticity using the net-of-tax 
return instead of the gross rate of return. Given that Swedish wealth tax was 1.5 percent, we can approximate for 
small numbers using the properties of logarithms 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1 + 𝑥) ≈ 𝑥 to express in terms of 0.1 percent point 
increase in the tax rate (Zoutman 2018; Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré and Mas-Montserrat 2019).  
17Member states of the Swiss Confederation. 
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to go below the threshold, giving elasticities local to the threshold. Since the wealthiest 
individuals may not simply go below the threshold, the estimations do not pick up their 
responses. Consequently, the elasticities obtained by bunching techniques are likely to be 
smaller. Seim (2017) uses a bunching technique, while Zoutman (2018) and Brülhart et al. 
(2019) both use a difference-in-difference estimation, where behavioral responses of those 
who do not target the threshold are also included.  
 
Jakobsen et al. (2020) investigate the effects of wealth taxation on wealth accumulation, using 
administrative wealth records from Denmark. They utilize the reform of 1989, where the 
wealth tax rate of 2.2 percent started to be greatly reduced, leading to abolishment in 1997. 
This provides them with a compelling quasi-experiment. Utilizing a Diff-in-Diff regression 
setup, they find significant effects of wealth taxation on wealth accumulation both in the short 
and medium run. Their estimates also indicate a smaller effect on the moderately wealthy 
compared to the very wealthy. When matching their model to the moderately wealthy, they 
find an effect of 8.9 percent increase in taxable wealth w.r.t a 1 percentage increase in the net-
of-tax rate after 8 years. When matching the model with the very wealthy, they obtain a net-
of-tax rate elasticity of 11.3 after 8 years.  
 
Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) study how individuals in Spain 
(Catalonia) reacted to the reintroduction of the wealth tax. If the average wealth tax rate 
increases by 0.1 percentage point, their results show a 3.24 percent reduction in taxable 
wealth after 4 years. Their main finding is that wealth tax does not prevent savings. The 
decrease in taxable wealth reflects tax avoidance, primarily through changes in the 
composition of financial holdings, with business assets as the primary vehicle. The estimates 
of Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) and Brülhart et al. (2019) 
indicate that the elasticities are notably higher in Spain and Switzerland, respectively, 
compared to what Jakobsen et al. (2020) find in Denmark. This might suggest that in 
countries with mainly little or no third-party reporting, tax evasion and avoidance is 
particularly prominent, compared to Denmark, where most wealth is third-party reported 
(Advani and Tarrant 2020).  
 
Ring (2020), studies Norwegian households’ response to capital taxation and contributes to 
the studies mentioned; increases in the wealth tax reduces taxable wealth (Zoutman 2018; 
Seim 2017; Jakobsen et al. 2020; Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 2019; 
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Brülhart et al. 2019). However, when limiting the role of evasion by only using third-party 
reported assets and variation below the top 1 percent in the wealth distribution, he finds very 
different results.18 He estimates that for each additional NOK affected by a 1 percent wealth 
tax, the individuals increase their yearly savings by 0.04 NOK. Increases in labor income 
mainly finance the increases in savings. He points out that capital taxes may incentivize 
individuals to put in more labor hours to meet these liabilities. His findings suggest that the 
income effect dominates the substitution effect. Presumably, an increase in the wealth tax 
motivates households to save to meet the future tax liability. 
 
Like Ring (2020), Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) initially find a 
reduction in taxable wealth by the wealth tax. However, by assuming that wealth taxes are 
primarily paid for by savings and accounting for mechanical effects, they find a positive 
effect of the wealth tax. An increase of 0.1 percentage point in the 2011 wealth tax rate 
increases reported wealth by 0.5 percent over 4 years. This translates into a net-of-tax rate 
elasticity of -0.1 and substantiates to some degree the findings of Ring; the income effect 
seems to dominate the substitution effect; individuals save to offset the increased tax 
liability.19 
 
Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2019) study the Colombian wealth tax using 
administrative data and a government-designed program for voluntary disclosure of wealth.20 
They show that evasion is particularly prominent on the top of the distribution. Two-fifths of 
the wealthiest 0.01 percent admit to hiding wealth. This group evades about one-third of its 
assets offshore. Utilizing a bunching strategy, they find that a 1 percentage increase in the net-
of-tax rate increases wealth by 2 percent in the short term. Moreover, they find that the 
marginal bunchers underreport their taxable wealth by 21 percent because of the tax notch.21 
This is done by increasing debt and exploiting that some business assets are not third-party 
reported, making it easier to underreport.  
 
 
18 He motivates this by the findings of Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2019a), who showed that evasion 
primarily occurs above the 99 percentile in the wealth distribution. 
19 Note: Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019) highlighted this as a potential explanation, 
while Ring (2020) expresses this with more certainty.   
20 Individuals might have been motivated by the leaked “Panama Papers.”  
21 Tax notch: discrete jumps in tax liability at given thresholds of reported wealth (Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-
Mahecha 2019). 
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Agrawal, Foremny, and Martínez-Toledan (2021) study the effect of wealth taxation on the 
mobility of wealth, using administrative data and tax variation across Comunidades 
Autómas22 in Spain. The wealth tax was abolished in 2008 and again reintroduced in 2011, 
where regions had autonomy over the wealth tax policies. Madrid chose to set the rate at zero, 
which created a tax haven. Five years after the reintroduction, the number of wealthy 
individuals in Madrid had risen by 9 percent. They estimate that the mobility elasticity, with 
respect to net-of-tax rate, is 7.5 after 5 years, indicating strong mobility effects of wealth 
taxation. Their elasticity isolates the inter-Spain migration, and they point towards evasion 
being the dominant mechanism rather than real responses to the wealth tax. 
 
As presented in this section, changes in reporting behavior, internal migration, evasion, or tax 
avoidance by placing capital in favorable assets explains most of the elasticities in these 
various studies (Zoutman 2018; Seim 2017; Brülhart et al. 2019; Jakobsen et al. 2020; of 
Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 2019; Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 
2019; Agrawal, Foremny and Martínez-Toledan 2021). However, Ring (2020), when limiting 
the roles of evasion, finds a positive saving response when households are subjected to the 
wealth tax. An indication that the income effect can outweigh the substitution effect. His 
findings are partially substantiated by Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 
(2019), who finds a slightly positive saving response when accounting for mechanical effects.  
 
Considering the studies mentioned above, we expect that an increase in the net-of-tax rate 
increases taxable wealth. Moreover, since most of the Norwegian assets are third-party 
reported, and that evasion primarily occurs on the top in the wealth distribution, we expect to 







22 Sub-national regions 
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3 Data 
3.1 Data Set 
We base the analysis in this investigation on the Norwegian taxpayer's tax return. We have 
received access to this data from NoCET (Norwegian Center for Taxation). Individuals are 
made anonymous; identification numbers replace names. The data set is designed as panel 
data; we have data from 2009-16 for each individual. If the individual has a spouse, it is 
identified with a spouse-specific identification number. The advantage of panel data is that we 
can study each individual over a particular period; it also allows us to control for specific 
unobserved characteristics of the individuals. Another advantage is that we can build dynamic 
models that can better indicate the effects of taxation (Wooldridge 2012).  
 
A Norwegian resident is liable to pay tax. Everyone who collects a salary, pension, or 
disability benefit receives a tax return each year. The tax return contains a summary of 
wealth, income, debt, and deductions (Skatteetaten(c) n.d.). These categories are primarily 
third-party reported, e.g., bank deposits, debt, financial holdings, etc. Each individual must 
check whether the information presented in the tax return is correct, and one may be held 
accountable for wrongdoings and liable to a non-compliance penalty tax. It makes tax evasion 
difficult and provides trustworthiness and reliable data for the investigation. 
 
The tax return is quite comprehensive and contains every source of potential taxation and 
deductions. NoCET has constructed our data set with regard to relevancy for our thesis. We 
have number-based information of the individual’s taxable income, taxable wealth, tax 
assessment of housing (primary, secondary, leisure, and foreign housing), deposits, debt, non-
listed and listed company shares, cash, movables, bonds, and business assets. Some assets are 
subject to valuation rebates; the value of the variables presented in the data set is after the 
rebate, given each tax assessment year's specific rules.  
 
3.2 Cleansing 
The dataset contains 31 804 386 observations from 2009 to 2016. The panel dimension is 
somewhat unbalanced; the reason is that not all individuals have data from each year. This 
might be because of death or emigration. On average, the data set contains 3 975 000 
individuals each year. To structure our data set, we start by combining the individual tax 
returns of spouses, summing the values of their variables. We do this because spouses are 
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assessed jointly on their taxable wealth, with double the activation threshold as an individual. 
Individuals without a spouse are still in the data set. We remove all households (singles and 
couples) who have negative taxable wealth for each year in the period. This counts for 6 526 
026 observations. We keep households who go from negative to positive somewhere in the 
period and vice versa. To be left with relevant observations in the data set, we remove all 
unstable marriages and individuals without data for each of the eight years – effectively 
removing spouses who have not been together the entire period and individuals who have died 
or emigrated during the eight years. This constitutes 5 974 713 observations. After these 
changes, the panel dimension becomes strongly balanced. This leaves us with 18 438 096 
observations, which we use in the first regression model (3), section 4.4. Before running our 
second regression model (6), section 4.6, we remove households with an average taxable 
wealth below zero. This counts for 5 200 520 observations, making 13 237 576 left and used 
in our estimation.  
  
Before receiving access to the data, NoCET removed all individuals with taxable wealth 
above 5 mNOK or income above 1.5 mNOK. This consideration is because of privacy issues, 
where one can easier match identification numbers with real names if wealth is big enough. 











This chapter describes the methodology used to study the causal relationship between wealth 
tax and taxable wealth. We investigate the effects of changes in the wealth tax on the 
household’s taxable wealth. The methodology we use is a static difference-in-difference 
estimator (Diff-in-Diff). We will present two regression specifications; we base the first on 
2014 wealth and the second on average wealth when determining treatment. 
 
4.1 Intuition Behind the Empirical Strategy  
As mentioned in the introduction, we utilize the tax reform of 2014-15 to isolate the wealth 
tax variation of the households. The reform of 2014-15 offers a compelling variation in the 
household’s wealth tax and provides two main sources of relief: a reduction in the rate from 1 
to 0.85 percent and an increase in the threshold from 1 to 1.2 mNOK. The wealth tax 
variations for the households are heterogeneous, as described in section 2.1.1. The tax rate 
changes for the households may arise from two different sources. Exogenously, through the 
changing tax environment, this allows us to identify causal effects of the impact of the wealth 
tax on taxable wealth. Endogenously, if households change their financial behavior and by 
that manner experience a change in the tax rate. In the spirit of Gruber and Saez (2002), we 
overcome these potential endogeneity problems by constructing an instrument for the 
counterfactual tax rate change. We expand on these points in section 4.3. 
 
These tax rate variations enable us to categories a treatment and control group, which we use 
in a quasi-experimental setting. The preferred regression setup is a Difference-in-Difference 
framework. The treatment group experiences a change in their tax rate, while the control 
group is unaffected by the tax reform, i.e., they are below the thresholds and do not face 
wealth tax obligations in either year. This allows us to regress household’s wealth on their tax 
rate change and capture the potentially distortionary effects of wealth taxation by examining 
wealth development after the reform. Furthermore, it allows us to report the elasticity of 
taxable wealth (ETW). 
 
In general, our regression and Diff-in-Diff estimations rely on the assumption of parallel 
trends between the treated and the control group before the reform. We run an event study to 
test the validity of our models. We motivate our second regression specification by the 
potential pitfalls of the first specification, which we discuss later on.  
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4.2 Wealth  
Let 𝑌!" denote our outcome variable taxable wealth for household 𝑖 in period 𝑡. Recall, we 
keep all individuals or couples who go from positive to negative wealth, or vice versa, 
somewhere in the period. The motivation behind this is not to exclude those subjected to the 
wealth tax in the reform of 2014-15 if they have negative wealth early in the period. Since we 
are interested in the elasticity, not levels of taxable wealth, we need to log-transform wealth. 
A well-known problem in economics is that the natural logarithm of zero or any negative 
value is undefined. In recent years the inverse hyperbolic sine (arcsinh) transformation has 
grown popular among applied econometricians because it allows for retaining zero and 
negative values; it is also similar to the logarithm function (Bellemare and Wichman 2019). 
Our dependent variable of interest, taxable wealth, is transformed as follows: 
 
(1)    𝑌!" = arcsinh	(𝑌!") = ln	(𝑌!" +1𝑌!"# + 1) 
 
4.3 Identification Strategy 
As mentioned in the intuition section, the tax rate variation of the households might arise from 
two sources. Exogenously, through the changing tax environment. Endogenously, through 
changes in saving behavior or to wealth shocks. The tax rate changes are directly linked to a 
household’s wealth development from 2014 to 2015. Therefore, these unobserved 
determinants of wealth might influence whether the households experience a changed tax rate. 
This includes bunching at the kink point of the threshold. Individuals are strongly incentivized 
to stay below the threshold because of the sharp increase in the wealth tax rate if they exceed 
it. It is unlikely to be a distorting factor in our estimation because it is challenging to bunch at 
the threshold by real savings responses, given that asset valuation changes constantly through 
the year (Jakobsen et al. 2020). However, firm owners might reduce their taxable wealth by 
placing capital into their private businesses, which are valued at book value (Bjørneby, 
Markussen, and Røed 2020). Exogenous shocks to wealth, like winning the lottery or 
inheritance, might also affect whether they experience a changed tax rate; this is a case of 
reverse causality and would be detrimental in the interference of causal effects. These 




We construct an instrument for the counterfactual tax rate change of the households to 
mitigate the dangers of endogeneity problems as described above. This closely follows 
Gruber and Saez's (2002) approach. We start by determining the wealth tax rate in a normal 
situation. Let 𝑡#$%& denote the wealth tax rate household 𝑖	is subjected to in a normal setting 
of 2014 assets valued at 2014 tax rules. This is the actual wealth tax rate an individual was 
liable for in 2014. Meaning, for an individual or couple with taxable wealth above the 
threshold, their wealth tax rate is 1 percent, 0 else wise. Then we identify what the wealth tax 
rate for household 𝑖 would be if i) the wealth tax policies changes from 2014 to 2015 rules 
and ii) the household does not change its behavior. We determine the household’s wealth tax 
rate valuing 2014 assets with 2015 rules. We correct the 2014 taxable wealth by changing the 
valuation rebates following 2015 rules for the different assets. After that, we utilize the 2015 
threshold. For households with 2014 wealth (valued at 2015 rules) above the 2015 threshold, 
the wealth tax rate is 0.85 percent; this is denoted by 𝑡#$%&#$%'. This allows us to hold the 
households’ behavior constant, effectively mitigating the danger of unobserved determinants 
affecting both their wealth and tax rate. Secondly, we calculate the difference between the 
constructed and the real wealth tax rate as follows: 
 
(2)     𝑇! = 𝑡#$%&#$%' − 𝑡#$%& 
 
This instrument is likely to fulfill the condition of independence to the unobserved parameter 
𝜀 of wealth. The changes a household may experience in their tax rate are only those induced 
by the changes in the tax system itself. In that manner, the instrument filters out unobserved 
changes in the household's financial behavior and exogenous shocks to wealth, which might 
simultaneously affect both wealth and treatment status. However, announcement effects of the 
reform might motivate households to align with the expected changes in the tax environment 
before its entry, leading to a bias in the instrument. Still, it is unlikely because the Ministry of 
Finance (2014) proposed the reform to the Norwegian Parliament in the latter part of 2014.23  
 
𝑇! measures the wealth tax rate change for household 𝑖, given that we keep household 
behavior constant. 𝑇! allows us to capture all changes made to the wealth tax policy, i.e., 
changes in rates, thresholds, and valuation rebate of assets.  
 
23 In the election campaign in 2013, Høyre advertised to reduce and remove wealth taxation (Høyre 
Hovedorganisasjon 2013). Høyre's election victory could have caused some behavioral responses.  
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4.4 Difference-in-difference Estimation 
A natural experiment (quasi-experiment) occurs if an exogenous event, for example, the 
reform of 2014-15, changes the households' environment. Unlike a real experiment where 
treatment and control groups are randomly selected, a natural experiment arises from the 
policy change itself. Panel data is beneficial in policy analysis because you follow the same 
cross-sectional units, allowing us to control unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge 2012).  
 
The 2014-15 reform enables us to categorize a treatment and a control group. The treatment 
group experiences an exogenous treatment, i.e., a change in their tax rate induced by the 
changed tax environment. The control group does not experience any difference, i.e., they are 
below both the 2014 and 2015 thresholds. Unlike a binary treatment identification, taking the 
values of 1 or 0 depending upon the individual receiving treatment or not. Our variable 𝑇! is 
continuous and may take the values of -1, -0.15, 0, and 0.85 percent. These values represent 
the four tax rate variation a household can experience in the reform (see section 2.1.1), where 
0 represents the control group. This variable is known as a continuous treatment variable or 
treatment intensity variable. As Angrist and Pischke (2008) describe, the interpretation of 
continuous treatment variables is essentially the same as the interpretation of binary treatment 
variables.24 We extend 𝑇! to all periods to separate the treatment and control group for the 
entire sample. To capture the effect of the tax policy change on the accumulation of wealth, 
we generate a time-dummy denoted 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟, taking the value of 1 if the year ≥ 2015, 0 else 
wise. We make an interaction variable between 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟	and 𝑇!, which constitute our 
independent variable of interest, 𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟". We are now able to run this static difference-in-
difference estimation, which comprises our base event for the first regression: 
 
(3)    𝑌!" = 𝑎! + 𝜂" + 𝛽𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟" + 𝜀!",			"*#$$+,			#$%$… ,-. 
 
Let 𝑌!" denote our outcome variable, taxable wealth for household 𝑖 in period 𝑡, transformed 
by the arcsinh function. Let 𝑎! represent household fixed effect, fixed in the sense that it does 
not have a time subscript. Meaning, we assume that heterogeneity amongst households is 
time-constant. By including household fixed effect, we can control for the fact that the 
heterogeneity between the households correlates with both wealth levels and treatment status. 
This can be, for example, heterogeneity in age, which is fixed to the person. Older individuals 
 
24 See page 57 of Angrist and Pischke (2008) for more details.   
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own, on average, more of the total wealth and are therefore more likely to receive treatment 
status in the reform. If we do not control for this, our estimates might wrongfully include 
these differences in wealth when estimating the effect of the tax treatment.  
 
Let 𝜂" denote time fixed effects. By including 𝜂" we are able to control for year-specific 
unobserved exogenous shocks to wealth which is symmetrical to all households. As economic 
growth flourishes, technology development accelerates, and prosperity increases, a 
household’s wealth may also grow as a positive consequence. For example, if the stock 
market or housing prices performs exceptionally well in one particular year, this might affect 
the household’s wealth and potentially their treatment status. If 𝜂" is excluded, then we would 
be unable to separate year-specific exogenous changes in wealth unrelated to the wealth tax 
from the true impact of the tax treatment. In our regression statistics, the year 2009 is the 
baseline. Let 𝜀!" denote the unobserved factors affecting the household’s wealth in period 𝑡. 
 
Our main parameter of interest is the coefficient for 𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟", represented by 𝛽. The 
coefficient represents the relationship between 𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟" and 𝑌!". 𝛽 captures that for an 
increase of 1 percentage point in the wealth tax rate, the treatment group experiences a 𝛽 ∗
100 percentage change in wealth. The estimation of 𝛽 allows us to make statements of the 
elasticity of taxable wealth, which is the main purpose of this study. By definition, the 
elasticity tells us to what extent wealth responds to a 1 percentage increase in the net-of-tax 
rate (1 − 𝑇!) (Advani and Tarrant 2020). This is the share of wealth kept after taxation. Given 
this definition, we present the relationship between our estimated 𝛽 and the elasticity of 
taxable wealth as follows: 25 
 








 denote the elasticity of taxable wealth, the percentage change in wealth by a 1 
percentage increase in the net-of-tax rate. By the properties of logarithms and derivatives, we 




 is the estimated coefficient 𝛽, i.e., the 
 
25 For simplicity, we represent the arcsinh function by log. 𝑑 = difference. 
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percentage change in wealth to a 1 percentage-point increase in the tax rate.26 When working 
with elasticities of wealth/income, the normal convention is to report the net-of-tax rate 
elasticity, and we will do the same.   
 
4.5 Validity of the Diff-in-Diff Regression – Event Study 
A crucial assumption of the validity of the difference-in-difference estimator is that the 
treatment group and control group in the absence of treatment follow the same trend. 
Moreover, it is the policy change exclusively that induces a change in the trend. If the 
treatment group and control group deviate from each other before the tax policy change, then 
causal interpretation will be difficult (Angrist and Pischke 2008). 
 
We assess the validity of our model by examining this assumption. We make the following 
alteration to our baseline event: 
 
(5)    𝑌!"	 =	𝑎! + 𝜂" +	𝜃" ∙ 𝑇! +	𝜀!" , 𝑡 = 2009, 2010… . 𝑇 
 
Where 𝜃" is a time dummy for period 𝑡. We interact the time dummies with 𝑇!, and we obtain 
coefficients for 𝑇! for each year in the period, except the event year 2014, which is normalized 
to zero. The event year serves as the reference point. 𝑇! still represent the treatment intensity 
variable. 𝑎! and 𝜂" still represent household fixed effects and time-fixed effects, respectively.  
 
We assume that the independent variable 𝑇! before the reform has non-significant estimates, 
and this is the assumption the Diff-in-Diff regression model (3) relies on. Most households in 
the treatment group receive a 0.15 percent reduction in their tax rate in the 2014-15 reform, 
which we extend to all periods. Suppose that in the pre-reform years, the regression picks up 
an increase in wealth each time it picks up this tax rate reduction, then it will most likely give 
a significant coefficient for this relationship. This entails that something unobserved happens 
to the treatment group’s wealth, which the control group does not experience, i.e., a deviation 
in the common trend. Therefore, the model's validity depends on non-significant estimates in 
the pre-reform years to correctly examine the effect of the 2014-15 reform. 
 
 
26 This is mainly applicable for small numbers. Consider a tax rate of 1 percent, 1-T (net-of-tax rate) = (1-0.01), 
a percentage (1-0.01) * 0.01 = 0.0099. Thereby, a one percentage increase in the net-of-tax rate roughly 
translates to one percentage-point reduction in the tax rate.  
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However, based on the treatment and control group specification, there is a possibility that 
this assumption does not hold. Mainly because it is not certain that those who receive 
treatment based on our construction of 𝑇! are persistently over the year-specific threshold. 
This is especially important because for pre-reform behavior to be a sufficient comparison to 
the post-reform behavior, households should have stable wealth and be subjected to the tax 
before the reform. Following the intuition of Gruber and Saez (2002), mean reversion can also 
bias the instrument. Mean reversion entails that wealth might be volatile each year but 
eventually reverts to its long-run mean. Households with low wealth in one year can have 
more significant wealth the following year, or vice versa. This can lead to the instrument not 
being exogeneous, which violates our assumption because mean-reverting can affect both 
wealth and potentially treatment status. To mitigate these potential problems, we motivate our 
second regression specification, and we expand on this in the next section.  
 
4.6 Second Specification of the Base Event  
Following the intuition discussed above, problems of mean reversion and inconsistent 
treatment status may distort our estimates. This would create issues with the definition of the 
treatment group. If households in our treatment group are consistently below the yearly 
thresholds before the reform, they do not constitute the best representation for the treatment 
group. This might be the case by how we construct our 𝑇!, where we allow households to have 
negative taxable wealth somewhere in the period. Ideally, the treatment group should always 
be above the threshold. However, this specification does not yield credible results. It might be 
because not many households wind up in the treatment group if we solely include those above 
the thresholds for the entire period. This might be due to the bounds of the data set. Recall, 
NoCET constructed the data set without households with taxable wealth and income above 5 
mNOK or 1.5 mNOK, respectively. Intuitively, a treatment group with households in the 
upper end of the distribution is more stable over the threshold for the entire period, making a 
separation of treated vs. control better. Nevertheless, as evasion is mainly prominent above 
the 99 percentile in the wealth distribution (Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman 2019a), we 
limit evasion responses by not including this group. 
 
If wealth follows a mean-reverting process, those with high wealth in the year of the reform 
might have lower wealth in the post-reform year or vice versa. This might bias the instrument, 
which we base on the 2014 assets. We may hand out treatment status to the households if 
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taxable wealth bounces over the threshold of 2014 and reverting below the threshold in 2015, 
unconditional upon the changed tax system. Similarly, a household usually above the 
thresholds may wind up in the control group, given a reversion of their taxable wealth. Our 
estimates might include these bounces in wealth since mean reversion can correlate with 
treatment status. Also, we assume that if wealth follows a mean reversion process, it must be 
uncorrelated with the changes made in the wealth tax policy (Zoutman 2015; Gruber and Saez 
2002). 
 
We augment our baseline event study (3) in two ways to deal with these potential problems. 
First, instead of valuating 2014 wealth by 2015 tax rules, we compute the average wealth for 
each household over the sample period. If the average exceeds the 2014 threshold, they would 
be liable to a wealth tax of 1 percent, represented by 𝑡#$%&	. Second, we incorporate the 2015 
tax system. In this case, the only difference is the increase in the threshold following the 2015 
rules. If the average still exceeds the threshold, their rate is changed to 0.85 percent, 
represented by 𝑡#$%&#$%'. Given our new specification, 𝑇! may take the values -1, -0.15 or 0. Note, 
the treatment intensity value of 0.85 is now gone; households with average taxable wealth 
below the 2014 threshold will never go over the 2015 threshold.27  
 
We further remove all households with average wealth below zero to make the treatment and 
control more comparable. Other studies have removed households at higher values. Gruber 
and Saez (2002) exclude households with income below 10 000 dollars; Weber (2014) does 
the same and tests with different cutoffs in the robustness check. Using an income/wealth 
cutoff is common in the literature because of too much mean reversion at the low end of the 
income distribution. Also, households on the lower level might be a poor comparison group 
(Weber 2014). Ring (2020) set the wealth cutoff level at zero. We choose to set the cutoff 
limit at zero because we do not want to restrict our sample more than it already is. Moreover, 
it is not obvious that mean reversion in the low end of the wealth distribution is as prominent 
as in the income distribution. Nevertheless, we utilize higher cutoffs in the robustness check 
in section 6.3. 
 
By implementing this strategy, we mitigate problems of mean reversion and unstable wealth. 
The new structure of our data set offers some advantages and pitfalls. An individual with a 
 
27 This strategy is based on advice from our supervisor Floris T. Zoutman. 
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taxable wealth of 5 mNOK (maximum on our sample) in 2009 and 0 in the other years will 
not receive treatment in 2014. The average is below the activation threshold. We also exclude 
outliers of extreme negative wealth. However, this strategy can entail that an individual with a 
taxable wealth of 5 mNOK in 2009 and 2010, zero else wise, still end up in the treatment 
group. The same goes for other variations of wealth. By an investigation of our new 
specification of treatment, this does not seem to be the case. 95 percent of those who are in 
the treatment group, according to their average taxable wealth, have actual 2014 wealth 
values over the activation threshold. This percent goes slightly down in 2015 and 2016, most 
likely because of the increases in the threshold. In the first regression (3) only 78 percent of 
those in the treatment group, by their 2014 wealth, have average taxable wealth above the 
threshold. Therefore, we argue that this treatment group is more stable and better represents 
those affected by wealth taxation. 
 
In our first Diff-in-Diff regression (3), we do not include any control variables. The literature 
suggests including 10-piece splines of wealth and income to mitigate problems of mean 
reversion (Gruber and Saez 2002). We choose to include splines in this regression 
specification. We use this as an index of where in the wealth/income distribution a household 
belongs. It is constructed on the average value of wealth (𝑦8K) and income (𝑧8K) for the 
household. It is in the range of 1 to 10, where 10 represent those in the top distribution. Also, 
we include controls for the development of wealth in each age interval over the period. 
 
We have arrived at our second specification of the base event:  
 
(6)  𝑌!" =	𝑎! +	𝜂" + 𝛽𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟" +∑ 𝜉9	𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸9(%$9*% 𝑦T!)𝑡 +	∑ 𝛿: 	𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸:(%$:*% 𝑧8K)𝑡 + 	
∑ 𝜑;𝐴𝑔𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠;';*% 𝑡 + 𝜀!" , 𝑡 = 2009, 2010… , 𝑇. 
 
This Diff-in-Diff regression follows the same intuition as (3). The only difference is the 
inclusion of the controls mentioned above, and the treatment intensity group 0.85 is gone. We 
base treatment status on average taxable wealth for the household instead of 2014 assets.  
 
Let 𝜉9	and 𝛿: represent the coefficients for the household’s wealth/income distribution 
interacted linearly with time. This allows us to control for the wealth/income development in 
each group over the sample period. Piketty and Saez (2014) report a growing inequality in 
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wealth/income in the US. In the period 1970 to 2010, the share of the top decile's 
wealth/income of the US total increased significantly. Presumably, this is less prominent in 
Norway. However, suppose we do not include controls for the distributions. In that case, our 
estimates might wrongfully pick up exogenous changes in wealth of the distributions 
unrelated to the tax rate change, especially since the top distributions correlate with both 
wealth and treatment status.  
 
Let 𝜑; denote the coefficients for each of the five equally large intervals of age interacted 
linearly with time. This allows us to control for the development of wealth in each interval of 
age over the sample period.28 The intuition is that we can control for different dynamics in 
each age group. Young people tend to increase in wealth by reducing their mortgages or save 
for pensions, while older individuals may start consuming and be on a downward trend in 
wealth. These potential dynamics might be correlated both with wealth and treatment status; 
we eliminate the bias from these trends by including this control. 
 
Note, Gruber and Saez (2002) highlight a potential problem if we base the splines on the 
average income/wealth and include the years after the reform, then the splines become 
endogenous to the tax reform. However, we argue that because of the slow-moving nature of 
wealth (Jakobsen et al. 2020) and the fact that we only have two post-reform years, this is 
unlikely to cause problems. 
 
The baseline event (6) also relies on the common trend assumption and will be tested by setup 






28 The interval the household belongs to is determined by their 2015 age. 
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5 Descriptive Statistics  
Before investigating the relationships between wealth taxation and taxable wealth, we 
describe the statistics. 
 
5.1 Statistics on the Full Sample   
Figure 3 below shows the average taxable wealth development for all individuals in our data 
set. The average has gone from - 36 000 to 77 000 NOK, increasing approximately 300 
percent from 2009 to 2016. Except for 2011, the development of taxable wealth has grown 
steadily. Calculating the standard deviation from the period, we find that it increases by 
approximately 33 percent, from 950 000 NOK in 2009 to 1 270 000 NOK in 2016. The 
standard deviation indicates that wealth does not concentrate around the population average. 
There are significant differences between the households in the data. To compare, the average 
taxable income in 2015 was 280 000 NOK, while the standard deviation was 270 000 NOK. 
This supports the general assumption that wealth is much less evenly distributed than income. 
Also, growth in both standard deviation and average may signify that wealth distribution has 
become more prominent. The median might be a more suitable measurement in skewed data 
distribution instead of the average. The median for taxable wealth has increased from 10 000 
NOK to 30 000 NOK in the period. It is lower than the average but an apparent growth. 
Considering that the wealth tax threshold has increased from 470 000 to 1 200 000 NOK in 















Development in Average Taxable Wealth – Full Sample 
 
Figure 3: The graph shows the average taxable wealth from 2009 to 2016 in 10 000 NOK. The graph is collected from the 
original data set and includes all individuals. Note: We have smoothed the graph using median spline.   
 
Table 3 below shows the summary statistic of all individuals in our dataset. Not surprisingly, 
we observe that households invest most of their wealth in housing, with 47.2 percent in 2016. 
Income presents the individuals' net income, net of any personal deductions. Income in our 
sample is not representable for the average gross income in Norway, but it gives a good 
indication of the average taxable income. Numbers from Statistics Norway (2021b) on gross 
income show that on average, in 2015, Norwegian workers earned 516 000 NOK. Meanwhile, 
we see that the average taxable income is very much below this number.29 We also observe a 
40 percent growth in debt from 2009 to 2016. On average, increased housing prices have led 
to increased wealth. We are becoming richer even though the debt is rising. However, high 
debt levels might still be a risk factor in the economy if exogenous shocks, like Covid-19, 






29 The individuals on the upper end in the income distribution would increase the average if they were included.  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on the Full Sample 
 
 
Figure 4 below shows the development of taxable wealth with age. It is judicious to reflect 
upon the individual's financial life cycle since taxable wealth is our dependent variable of 
interest. Individuals' tendency to have negative wealth early in life, which becomes positive 
towards mid-life, is intuitive. Early in life, individuals often consume more than their income 
dictates. Society expects that younger individuals borrow money for education and primary 
residence. As life progresses, mortgages are paid off, and income streams are steady. 
Financial freedom also increases as individuals/couple's offspring leave the nest and start their 
financial life cycle. When the retirees begin to face their inevitable fate, they sell their assets 
to the young, who are in the phase of accumulating wealth. This is the classical Modigliani 
life cycle hypothesis (Deaton 2005). The graph substantiates this hypothesizes and shows that 
negative wealth early in life reverts at mid-age and peaks at retirement. Moreover, it is 
evident, that on average, it is the older individuals who pay wealth taxation in Norway. 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Taxable Wealth (mean) 35 900-        18 400        12 700        19 700        24 700        27 500        50 500        77 700        
Income (mean) 230 700      238 600      249 500      259 700      268 900      276 500      284 300      Missing
Debt (mean) 703 800      738 200      776 700      819 400      857 200      899 200      936 400      986 100      
Housing % of wealth 38,80 44,90 45,20 46,50 46,20 46,10 46,70 47,20
Listed shares % of wealth 2,58 2,44 1,98 1,93 2,09 2,07 2,22 0,62
Unlisted shares % of wealth 0,97 0,90 0,89 0,89 0,92 0,97 1,02 1,12
Business assets % of wealth 4,35 3,18 3,12 2,89 2,89 2,72 2,59 2,64
Men in % 49,60 49,70 49,80 50,00 50,20 50,30 50,20 50,20
Age 53,85 51,75 51,68 50,64 49,60 48,65 47,80 47,64
Observations 3 753 351   3 822 537   3 892 323   3 966 513   4 043 608   4 110 278   4 156 909   4 058 867   
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Relationship Between Age and Taxable Wealth in 2015
 
Figure 4: Average taxable wealth (in NOK) in relation to age from the original data set. Based on 2015 wealth. Note: We 
have smoothed the graph using median spline. 
 
Figure 5 below presents the number of individuals liable to wealth taxation each year, and it 
shows the average wealth tax payments. We created the graph after combining couples. We 
observe that the number of households liable to wealth tax has decreased over the period, 
while the average wealth tax payments have increased. Average payments have gone 
significantly up, starting with 6 700 NOK in 2009, peaking in 2013 with 8 500 NOK, and 
ending in 2016 with 8 250 NOK; that is a total increase of 23 percent. Knowing that the 
yearly activation thresholds have increased over the period, the increase in average payments 
are most likely coming from growth in wealth. As fewer people are liable to wealth taxation, 
the remaining wealthy taxpayers drag the average upwards. The number of individuals paying 
wealth tax has gone drastically down; in 2009, it was approximately 650 000 individuals, 
constituting 17 percent of the individuals in the data set. In 2016, the number was down to 
about 400 000, just around 10 percent. The wealth tax liability is more concentrated around 
the wealthiest individuals in 2016 compared to 2009.  
 
Figure 5 is quite similar to the one made by Statistics Norway and The Ministry of Finance 
(Figure 2), presented in section 2.2. With the exception that our data do not contain the top 
1.5 percent of the wealthiest individuals. Comparing the two graphs, we observe the same 
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trend and almost the same percentage of individuals paying wealth tax. The difference lies in 
the average wealth tax payments. In figure 2, average payments are roughly 25 000 NOK in 
2009, ending in over 30 000 NOK in 2016. Almost four times the average payments 
individuals in our data set paid. 
 
Average Wealth Tax Paid and Numbers of Individuals Paying Wealth Tax in 2009-16 
 
Figure 5: Average wealth tax paid (left y-axis) and the number of individuals paying wealth tax (right y-axis) from 2009 to 
2016. The graph is collected from the original data set and includes only individuals who pay wealth tax. Average wealth tax 
paid is in NOK. Note: We have smoothed the graph using median spline. 
 
5.2 Treatment and Control Group – First Regression Specification (3) 
Figure 6 and Table 4 below show the development and statistics for the treatment and control 
group we use in the first Diff-in-Diff regression (3). We exclude households with negative 
taxable wealth through the whole period and households without observations in all years.  
 
From the graph, we observe that the treatment group had, on average, a 117 percent total 
increase in taxable wealth over the period; increasing from nearly 900 000 NOK to over 1 950 
000 NOK in the eight years. The control group, on the other hand, had a more volatile 
development. Starting in the neighborhood of 30 000 NOK in 2009, ending in 2016 with 
approximately 181 000 NOK; a 500 percent total growth. The control group is quite more 
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unstable than the treatment group. As previously discussed, this might induce some problems 
with identification. The households in the treatment group are, on average, older than the 
households in the control group, which the life-cycle graph of taxable wealth also reflects. In 
addition, households in the treatment group have more weight of the financial composition in 
listed shares and business assets than the control group.  
 
Development in Average Taxable Wealth for the Treatment and Control Group  
 
Figure 6: The development of average taxable wealth in NOK for the treatment and control group used in the first Diff-in-
Diff regression (3), from 2009 to 2016. Note: We have smoothed the graph using median spline. 
 
Table 4: Treatment and Control Group Used in the First Diff-in-Diff Regression (3) 
Treatment Group 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Taxable Wealth (mean) 898 900      1 148 100   1 252 900   1 410 900   1 599 700   1 831 800   1 875 200   1 951 500   
Income (mean) 332 000      345 700      365 000      382 700      394 100      411 610      408 500      Missing
Debt (mean) 317 500      312 500      305 700      395 700      275 190      227 600      271 450      298 600      
Housing % of wealth 30,20 38,07 38,59 38,81 38,26 37,21 38,10 38,82
Listed shares % of wealth 6,07 5,70 4,75 4,70 5,13 5,12 5,58 1,90
Unlisted shares % of wealth 2,50 2,40 2,43 2,45 2,54 2,74 2,66 2,65
Business assets % of wealth 7,79 5,91 5,81 5,52 5,33 4,99 4,74 4,56
Men in % 51,05 51,1 51,03 51,15 51,15 51,1 51,15 51,15
Age (mean) 65,86 65,88 65,89 65,89 65,89 65,89 65,89 65,88






5.3 Treatment and Control Group – Second Regression Specification (6) 
The statistics and development for the treatment and control group we use in the second Diff-
in-Diff regression are shown in Figure 7 and Table 5 below. We define the treatment group 
almost in the same manner as in the first Diff-in-Diff regression. Instead of basing treatment 
status on the 2014 assets, we base it on average taxable wealth for the household over the 
sample period. We restrict the control group to only include positive wealth values to make 
the groups more comparable and stable. By determining treatment status on average taxable 
wealth, we are more confident that the households are persistently in a wealth tax position.30 
 
We see a steady growth of average wealth in both groups. On average, the treatment group 
has seen their wealth increased by 90 percent, from 1 145 000 NOK in 2009 to 2 185 000 
NOK in 2016. The control group has had a steeper growth with 180 percent in the same 
period, from 187 000 NOK to 531 000 NOK. Table 5 also shows some financial composition 
differences between the groups. The treatment group has a lesser percentage of wealth in 
housing and more in listed shares and business assets than the control group. This is in line 
with the notion that business owners and active investors are financially better off than 
individuals with income streams primarily from labor. A US survey conducted by Federal 
Reserve Bulletin (2020) indicates that 31 percent of households in the bottom half of the 
income distribution invest in stocks. In the top decile, as much as 90 percent hold stocks. We 
 
30 Ninety-five percent of those with average taxable wealth above the 2014 threshold had actual 2014 taxable 
wealth above the threshold. 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Taxable Wealth (mean) 30 316        74 320        71 070        76 310        75 115        57 060        125 485      181 360      
Income (mean) 217 190      230 170      244 980      258 270      270 500      280 585      291 910      Missing
Debt (mean) 334 000      362 600      398 200      439 600      481 000      529 400      540 900      564 600      
Housing % of wealth 31,44 36,21 37,15 39,07 39,76 40,51 41,61 42,48
Listed Shares % of wealth 3,60 3,40 2,80 2,68 2,80 2,80 2,90 0,70
Unlisted shares % of wealth 0,98 0,93            0,92            0,92            0,95      0,98            1,07            1,17            
Business assets % of wealth 4,46 3,52 3,52 3,35 3,40 3,28 3,19 3,18
Men in % 50,60 50,70 49,90 50,02 50,20 50,02 50,60 50,20
Age (mean) 53,46 53,49 53,51 53,52 53,52 53,51 53,51 53,50
Observations 1 845 714   1 845 714   1 845 714   1 845 714   1 845 714   1 845 714   1 845 714   1 845 714   
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see the same tendencies. This might indicate that households with higher income have more 
financial freedom and want to save in order to consume more later in life. 
 
In comparison with the first treatment and control group, we experience some differences. 
First of all, visually, it looks like these groups are more comparable. Second, the first control 
group contains over 560 000 more households than the second. Third, the second control 
group is less volatile and does not increase as much during the period as the first. And fourth, 
the second treatment and control group contain individuals who have a more considerable 
taxable wealth. This makes the households in the control group more similar in behavior with 
the treatment group because the wealth gap is smaller than in the first treatment and control 
group. 
 
Development in Average Taxable Wealth for the Treatment and Control Group 
 
Figure 7: Development in average taxable wealth (in NOK) in the treatment and control group used in the second Diff-in-























2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Taxable Wealth (mean) 1 145 800   1 409 600   1 510 400   1 649 700   1 799 200   1 922 900   2 066 500   2 185 300   
Income (mean) 311 310      354 210      372 600      388 590      401 800      410 740      408 400      Missing
Debt (mean) 236 100      226 100      220 800      220 400      219 500      217 200      217 100      227 300      
Housing % of wealth 28,02 35,41 35,93 36,07 35,94 35,64 36,15 36,78
Listed shares % of wealth 6,37 6,12 5,04 5,01 5,48 5,52 5,93 2,14
Unlisted shares % of wealth 2,83            2,71            2,71            2,76            2,70            2,77            2,78            2,79            
Business assets % of wealth 8,00 6,26 6,14 5,85 5,59 5,18 4,89 4,68
Men in % 51,32 51,32 51,32 51,32 51,32 51,32 51,32 51,32
Age (mean) 67,38 67,40 67,41 67,41 67,41 67,41 67,41 67,40
Observations 371 542      371 542      371 542      371 542      371 542      371 542      371 542      371 542      
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Taxable Wealth (mean) 187 460      264 230      296 110      340 690      382 830      423 350      479 740      531 090      
Income (mean) 219 600      230 160      243 700      255 700      266 700      275 490      282 260      Missing
Debt (mean) 213 500      213 400      214 600      218 800      223 300      227 800      233 400      247 900      
Housing % of wealth 32,8 37,35 37,89 38,88 39,02 38,93 39,51 40,07
Listed Shares % of wealth 3,73 3,67 3,01 2,90 3,10 3,08 3,20 0,76
Unlisted shares % of wealth 0,92            0,88            0,87            0,88            0,91            0,95            0,99            1,04            
Business assets % of wealth 4,57 3,65 3,60 3,46 3,44 3,32 3,22 3,20
Men in % 37,21 37,21 37,21 37,21 37,21 37,21 37,21 37,21
Age (mean) 58,46 58,48 58,49 58,49 58,49 58,49 58,49 58,48
Observations 1 283 155   1 283 155   1 283 155   1 283 155   1 283 155   1 283 155   1 283 155   1 283 155   
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6 Results and Discussion 
This chapter presents the results from the Diff-in-Diff regression (3) in section 4.4 and the 
extended and altered Diff-in-Diff regression (6) in section 4.6. Also, we present the results 
from the event study of both the regression specifications, including the long-run elasticity of 
taxable wealth. We base our analysis, discussion, and robustness check on the second 
regression specification (6) due to the instability of our first specification (3). 
 
6.1 The First Regression Specification (3) 
 
Table 6: First Regression Specification (3)  
 (1)  
   Main  
  
   
						𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟"  




   
10-piece spline for Wealth  
10-piece spline for Income  
Age splines   
Household/Time fixed effect 
   
  
R-Squared  








Nr of Observations  18 438 096  
    
Note: This is the first regression specification (3) from section 4.4. Taxable wealth is transformed by the arcsinh function. 
We exclude households with strictly negative wealth values for the whole period, allowing individuals to have negative 
taxable wealth for some years. The parameter of interest is	T!After", representing a (100*	T!After") percentage change in 
wealth by an increase of 1 percentage point in T! (tax rate). Fixed effects estimation is used in STATA. Standard errors are 












Event Study of the First Regression Specification (3) 
  
Figure 8: The event study is based on the estimation (5) in section 4.5. Note: in table 6, 𝑇#𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟$ is an interaction between 𝑇# 
and the two years after 2014. In the event study, 𝑇# interacts with each year in the period, where 2014 is normalized to zero. 
2014 is the wealth we chose to incorporate the 2015 tax rules on, i.e., the tax policy entrance point. Standard errors are 
clustered at the individual/household level. Confidence intervals are at the 95 percent significance level.  
Following the intuition from the Diff-in-Diff regression (3):	𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟" constitutes our 
instrument for the wealth tax rate interacted with a time dummy ≥2015. By including a time 
dummy, we observe the effect for the treated household 𝑖, after the reform. The coefficient 
represents that for a 1 percentage point increase in the wealth tax rate, the treatment group 
experiences a (𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟" ∗ 100) percentage change in wealth. 
 
Our main results (1) identify that for a 1 percentage point increase in the wealth tax rate, the 
treated experience a reduction in wealth of 17.4 percent aggregate in the two years. The 
coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. The effect is relatively large, but the sign of the 
coefficient is reassuring and in line with our expectations. Given the relationship between the 
net-of-tax rate elasticity and our estimated coefficient, a 1 percentage increase in the net-of-
tax (1 − 𝑇!) leads to a 17.4 percent increase in wealth. The reduction in wealth by an increase 
in the tax rate, is in line with findings of other studies (Zoutman 2018; Seim 2017; Brülhart et 
al. 2019; Jakobsen et al. 2020; of Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019); 
Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 2019; Agrawal, Formny and Martínez-Toledan 2021).  
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6.1.1 Event Study 
However, as discussed in section 4.5, the validity of our regression estimates depends on the 
common trend assumption. Looking at the event study in figure 8, this assumption evidently 
fails. We observe a strong V-shape of the variable 𝑇! 	interacted with yearly dummies, where 
2014 is normalized to zero. The premise relies on non-significant estimates in the pre-reform 
years, which means that the treatment status in the model-implied construction of 𝑇! should 
not offer significant predictions in the pre-reform years. It does, highly significant estimates 
(CI’s are included, just not visible). As discussed in the method chapter, especially sections 
4.5 and 4.6, these problems might arise in the case of mean reversion in wealth. Recall, we 
choose to include households with negative taxable wealth somewhere in the period, but not 
the entire period. Using an income/wealth cutoff is common in the literature because of too 
much mean reversion at the low end of the distribution. Also, households on the lower level 
might be a poor comparison group (Weber 2014). Eighteen percent of those who receive 
treatment status have negative taxable wealth somewhere in the period. Indeed, the argument 
put forward by Weber (2014) might very well be the reason our event study is not valid. 
These households with negative wealth must be very volatile in order to be over the 2014 
threshold. Problems of mean reversion in our two groups are not unlikely. Since the validity 
of our Diff-in-Diff estimations is not anchored in the event study, we proceed to the next 

















6.2 The Second Regression Specification (6) – Main Results 
 
Table 7: Second Regression Specification (6) – Main Results 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
   Main Result  
   
No Age Spline  Only Wealth 
Splines  
No Controls  
Panel A: Main Results  
   
                 
𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟" 
  
   
   
   
 -0.0224*** 
(0.005)  
   
   
   
-0.0211** 
(0.005)  
   
   
   
 -0.0116*** 
(0.005)  
   
   
   
  0.266*** 
(0.005)  
   
   
10-piece spline for Wealth  
10-piece spline for Income  
Age splines  
Household/Time fixed effects 
   
R-Squared  
Nr of Observations  
  





   
0.089  
13 237 576  
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Nr of Observations  13 237 576  13 237 576  13 237 576  13 237 576  
  
         
Note: The outcome variable wealth is transformed by the arcsinh function. A household may have negative taxable wealth in 
one or more years, even if the average taxable wealth is positive. Panel A presents the main results of the second Diff-in-Diff 
regression (6), section 4.6. The estimation of 𝑇#𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟$ is based on the two subsequent years after the entry point of the 2014 
reform. Fixed effects estimation is used in STATA. Splines for wealth/income are controls for the development in each group 
over the period. Age splines are controls for wealth development within five equally larger intervals of age over the period. 
Other studies have used the age of the primary earner. We chose to sum and divide couples' age by two to determine which 
group they belong to. Panel B: debunks the two subsequent years after the reform into a short-run and “long-run” estimate of 
the elasticity of taxable wealth. Standard errors are clustered at the individual/household level. Standard errors in parentheses     









Event Study of the Second Regression Specification (6) – Main Result (1) 
 
Figure 9: Event study based on the second regression Specification (6), section 4.6 – Main Result (1). Note: in Table 7 Panel 
A,	𝑇#𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟$	is an interaction between 𝑇# and the two years after 2014. In the event study, 𝑇# interacts with each year in the 
period, where 2014 is normalized to zero. 2014 is the entrance point of the tax reform. Standard errors are clustered at the 
individual/household level. Confidence intervals are on the 95 percent significance level. 
Following the intuition of the second regression specification (6). The interpretation of 	
𝑇!𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟" is the same as in the first regression specification. We base the treatment and control 
group in this Diff-in-Diff regression on their average wealth instead of the 2014 assets as in 
the first regression. We remove all households with average taxable wealth below zero. The 
descriptive statistics (section 5.3) show that the treatment and control groups are more 
comparable than the two groups in the first regression. They are more similar in terms of 
wealth levels. The development of the control group's taxable wealth is more stable than the 
first control group. Also, comparing the two figures of the two different sets of groups 
(section 5.2 and 5.3), the second seems to capture a more similar trend.  
 
Panel A of regression Table 7 presents the main results of the second regression specification. 
We include four alterations of this regression specification, including one additional control 
variable at the time, leading up to the main results (1). We observe that the model is sensitive 
to control variables. Regression (4) gives a positive coefficient for tax rate, a large and 
significant effect at the 1 percent level. When we include controls for the household’s wealth 
distribution in regression (3), the sign of the coefficient switches, which is not unique for our 
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model as the same happened in Gruber and Saez (2002). We obtain a net-of-tax rate elasticity 
of 1.16. The coefficient is significant at the 1 percent level. In regression (2), we include 
controls for the income distribution of the household as well. Reassuring, the coefficient is 
still negative, and we obtain a larger effect, significant at the 5 percent level.  
 
6.2.1 Main Results (1) 
In addition to wealth/income distribution controls, we added controls for the development of 
wealth in each age interval over the period. We observe that the effect has enlarged. A 1 
percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces wealth by 2.24 percentage in aggregate, 
significant at the 1 percent level. This translates to a net-of-tax rate elasticity of 2.24, which is 
our main finding in this thesis. We debunk the two post-reform years in panel B and obtain a 
more sizeable coefficient for 2016. A 1 percentage increase in the net-of-tax rate increases 
wealth by 6.5 percent. This indicates a sluggish response to taxation and is in line with most 
of the other studies. Our findings substantiate the existing literature, an increase in the tax rate 
reduces taxable wealth (Zoutman 2018; Seim 2017; Brülhart et al. 2019; Jakobsen et al. 2020; 
Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 2019; Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 
2019; Agrawal, Formny and Martínez-Toledan 2021). Moreover, it contradicts the findings of 
Ring (2020), which is the only other Norwegian study on this topic.  
 
6.2.2 Compared to Scandinavian Studies 
Seim (2017), using a bunching technique, estimates the net-of-tax rate elasticity in Sweden to 
be 0.09-0.27. By an approximation, a 0.1 percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces 
wealth by 0.027 percent using the upper bounds of his estimates.31 In our estimates, a 0.1 
percentage point increase in the tax rate reduces wealth by 0.224 percent. As Advani and 
Tarrant (2020) highlight, bunching techniques normally exploit an individuals' motivation to 
aim their wealth to go below the threshold, giving elasticities local to the threshold. Since the 
wealthiest individuals may not simply go below the threshold, the estimations do not pick up 
their responses. Consequently, the elasticities obtained by bunching techniques are likely to 
be smaller. Our estimates are somewhat larger than Seim’s, but we utilize a diff-in-diff 
 
31 Seim's (2017) estimates are not entirely comparable because he estimates the elasticity w.r.t the net-of-tax rate 
while we estimate in terms of increases in the tax rate. Given that the Swedish wealth tax was 1.5 percent, we 
can approximate for small numbers using the properties of logarithms log(1+x) ≈ x to express in terms of 0.1 




identification, where we include not only those who target the threshold. Hence, our elasticity 
is reasonably larger. However, the evidence for larger elasticities of the wealthiest is not 
entirely apparent but suggestive (Jakobsen et al. 2020; Zoutman 2018). 
 
Jakobsen et al. (2020) estimate the 8-year net-of-tax rate elasticity, using Danish wealth data 
in a Diff-in-Diff framework, to be 8.9 for the moderately wealthy and 11.3 for the very 
wealthy. Considering that this is the 8-year aggregate response, they are more similar in terms 
of our estimates. We have data only for two post-reform years; looking at panel B, the 
second-year estimates come close to Jakobsen et al.'s (2020) findings of the moderately 
wealthy. If we had more than two post-reform years, our estimates of aggregate responses 
would likely become similar to the Danish findings on the moderately wealthy.32 
 
Ring (2020), in the only other Norwegian study on the elasticity of taxable wealth, finds very 
different results than us. He estimates that for each NOK subjected to the 1 percent wealth 
tax, households increase savings by 0.04 NOK, primarily financed by labor earnings. Notably, 
he initially finds that the wealth tax reduces the amount of taxable wealth which households 
report. However, he arrives at this positive effect after limiting evasion opportunities. 
Suggesting that the income effect dominates the substitution effect, individuals presumably 
save to maintain future consumption or to meet the tax liability. He removes the wealthiest 1 
percent (NoCET removed the top 1.5 percent in our data); he motivates this by the findings of 
Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2019a), evasion primarily occurs above the 99 
percentile of the wealth distribution. By his argument, we also limit the scopes of evasion. 
Further, he keeps only individuals with wealth above zero. Our choice of cutoff limits 
coincides with his. Nevertheless, we arrive at different effects of Norwegian wealth taxation. 
Most of the assets in the data set are third-party reported, leaving us with minor concerns 
about tax fraud or evasion. However, some assets like foreign housing and deposits are 
primarily self-reported.33 Ring (2020) excludes these assets in his estimation; we do not. This 
 
32 The moderately wealthy constitutes the households between the 97.6th and the 99.3rd percentile in wealth 
distribution. 
33 Norwegian tax authorities cooperate with 109 countries regarding the exchange of information of the 
individuals' financial standings. The Norwegian tax authorities receive information on 350 000 Norwegian 
residents with foreign capital holdings (NTB 2021; Skatteetaten(b) n.d.). However, this does not necessarily 
limit individuals from underreporting foreign holdings in non-collaborative countries. The Norwegian tax 
authorities must rely on the individual to report correctly. 
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might entail that our elasticities pick up evasion if households, for example, move capital to 
offshore accounts or underreport the value of foreign assets.  
 
The findings of Seim (2017) suggest that evasion is greatly restricted when self-reporting is 
limited. Additionally, the findings of Alstadsæter, Johannesen, and Zucman (2019b) indicate 
that when the Norwegian government boosted the enforcement effort, many wealthy 
individuals disclosed previously hidden assets.34 Notably, the disclosure of wealthy 
individuals evaded assets did not increase avoidance by investing in tax-favored assets.  
 
These findings lead us to the conclusion that evasion is unlikely a distorting factor in our 
estimation. Because our data set does not contain the top 1.5 percent, the efficient 
enforcement by the Norwegian government makes evasion difficult, and the fact that self-
reporting is limited also reduces these responses. However, there are several popular tax 
avoidance schemes, which our estimates might pick up. Bjørneby, Markussen, and Røed 
(2020), using Norwegian data, find that business owners invest in human capital to reduce 
their taxable wealth due to the favorable tax valuation of private companies.35 Importantly, we 
must distinguish our estimates of those by Ring (2020). Our estimations point in the direction 
of a reduction in taxable wealth by an increase in the wealth tax rate. Evasion responses are 
somewhat limited. Nevertheless, we do not take the same measures as Ring (2020) to verify 
that these effects are limited. We cannot be entirely sure whether the effects we are seeing are 
real saving responses to wealth taxation or if it signals evasion or avoidance. Regardless, 
wealth taxation reduces the household’s taxable wealth. The implication of this may be in 
particular interest of the policymaker’s because it may signal inefficient resource allocation 
when households are faced with an increased tax liability—for example, placing a 
considerable amount in primary residences instead of value-added investments. In addition, 
households might place more capital into non-listed companies to reduce their taxable wealth 





34 The Norwegian tax administration operates a tax amnesty program. 1,500 taxpayers disclosed previously 
hidden assets during 2008-2016. 
35 Glodal and Hestdal (2015) estimate that the average tax valuation rebate for non-listed firms traded at the 
Norwegian OTC-list is 68.1 percent, making them lucrative as a tax avoidance vehicle. 
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6.2.3 Compared to Studies Outside Scandinavia  
Zoutman (2018), using data from the Netherlands, estimates that a 1 percentage point increase 
in the tax rate reduces wealth by 11.6 percent after 1 year and 13.8 percent after 4 years. His 
estimates show a slight difference between the short-run and long-run elasticity, indicating 
that most of the adjustment seems to come immediately. He expresses that this is unlikely to 
be changes in real behavior, changes in reporting behavior are more plausible. These 
estimates are quite larger than our Norwegian estimates. Because wealth levels are more 
concentrated in the Netherlands than Norway36 and studies suggest larger elasticities in the 
upper end of the distribution,37 these higher elasticities are arguably reasonable.  
 
Our estimates are quite smaller than those found in Switzerland and Spain. Durán-Cabré, 
Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat (2019), using Spanish data, estimate that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the tax rate reduces taxable wealth by 32.4 percent after 4 years. They 
conclude that savings are unaffected and that their estimates mainly signal avoidance, with 
business assets as the primary vehicle. Note, they estimate how individuals respond to the 
reintroduction of the wealth tax in Spain. The wealth tax jumped from zero to 2.5 percent at 
most.38 This significant increase in the wealth tax liability might give stronger behavior 
responses than our Norwegian study, where there has only been a marginal reduction in the 
tax rate. While in Switzerland, Brülhart et al. (2019) estimate that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the tax rate reduces wealth by 41.1 percent in aggregate after 4 years. These 
relatively high elasticities indicate that evasion and avoidance are particularly prominent in 
countries with little to no third-party reporting. While in the Scandinavian countries, where 
most assets are third-party reported, the elasticities (ours included) are much smaller (Ring 
2020; Jakobsen et al. 2020; Seim 2017).  
 
In Norway, the wealth tax is centralized, while in Switzerland, there is inter-cantonal 
variation, and in Spain, there is variation between the Comunidades Autómas.39 Agrawal, 
Foremny, and Martinez-Toledano (2020) estimate the mobility elasticity w.r.t. net-of-tax rate 
to be 7.5 after 5 years in Spain. They isolate the effects of inter-regional migration, leaving 
 
36 The Netherlands had a wealth gini-coefficient of 0.902 in 2018 compared to Norway which had 0.798 (Credit 
Suisse 2019).  
37 Estimates of Zoutman (2018) and Jakobsen et al. (2020) 
38 The wealth tax was progressive - ranging from 0.2 to 2.5 percent, with regional differences in both thresholds 
and tax rates (Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 2019). 
39 Sub-national regions 
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out other responses. This response is smaller than what Durán-Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and 
Mas- Montserrat (2019) find in Spain. They measure the overall elasticity but exclude 
migration responses, giving them much larger elasticities. Brülhart et al. (2019) estimate that 
inter-cantonal migration explains about 24 percent of their elasticities. These responses 
indicate that in countries with inter-regional variation in tax policies, the elasticities are more 
significant than in countries with a uniform tax policy. Our estimates are reasonably smaller 
by this argument because there is no variation between the Norwegian municipalities, even 
though they have autonomy over their part of the wealth tax.  
 
Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha (2019), using Colombian data, estimate that a 1 
percentage increase in the net-of-tax rate increases wealth by 2 percent in the short-term. 
These findings are, arguably, the closest to our elasticity. However, as they utilize a bunching 
strategy, it is reasonable to assume that they would have been larger using a Diff-in-Diff 
framework.   
 
6.2.4 Summary 
Changes in reporting behavior, inter-regional migration, or tax avoidance by placing capital in 
favorable assets explains most of the elasticities in these various studies (Zoutman 2018; 
Durán- Cabré, Esteller-Moré, and Mas-Montserrat 2019; Londoño-Vélez and Ávila-Mahecha 
2019; Agrawal, Formny, and Martínez-Toledan 2021). We are, however, unable to separate 
these responses from real saving behavior in our study. By the more significant response in 
the second year, it seems reasonable to think Norwegian households are primarily passive 
savers,40 as in Denmark (Chetty et al. 2014). They might be surprised by their new after-tax 
return after the reform. Their response to this reform is not apparent until they have had the 
time to assess the new rate of return (Zoutman 2015). In the second post-reform year (2016), 
households had the time to evaluate their new after-tax rate of return and align with the new 
tax environment. The response may capture both real saving behavior as well as avoidance. 
The short-run elasticity may reflect active savers' early adjustment, while the long-run 
estimates include the sluggish response of passive savers. 
 
 
40 Chetty et al. (2014) describe passive savers as those who are inattentive to tax subsidies and are heavily 
influenced by contributions made on their behalf. While the active savers respond to tax subsidies by shifting 
assets across accounts. 
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6.2.5 Event Study  
This model also relies on the common trend assumption proposed in section 4.5. When 
comparing the event study of the second regression specification (6) (figure 9) to the first 
regression specification (3) (figure 8), we see a remarkable improvement. We observe non-
significant predictions of the instrument in the years: 2009, 2012, and 2013. Where 2014 is 
the base year and normalized to zero. This shows that our second regression specification (6) 
has successfully mitigated some of the problems in our first regression specification. By 
basing treatment status on average taxable wealth instead of 2014 assets, we mitigate 
implications of mean reversion. This model is more stable and representable of those 
continuously subjected to the wealth tax liability. Furthermore, the control group has been 
made more comparable. 
 
However, we see large significant effects of the instrument in the years 2010 and 2011. These 
estimates are coherent with the wave of increases in the valuation of assets from 2008-11.  
Before the tax reform of 2009-10, housing's tax valuation was based on historical cost, with 
an annual adjustment from previous years' tax value (Bjørneby, Markussen, and Røed 2020). 
The policymakers changed it to estimated sales value based on comparable housing in the 
same geographical area from 2010 and onward (Ministry of Finance 2009).41 These policy 
changes inevitably increased many households’ taxable wealth due to the great difference 
between market value and historical cost, especially since older housing was undervalued 
relative to newer housing. At the same time, business assets went from an annual adjustment 
of historical cost to market value, a significant increase for some wealthy individuals.  
 
Those who received treatment in our model by their average wealth most likely experienced 
these rather significant increases in taxable wealth. Most households in the treatment group 
receive a reduction of 0.15 percent in their tax rate in the 2014-15 reform. This reduction is 
represented by 𝑇! which we extended to all years. Meaning, when the regression picks up this 
reduction and that wealth substantially increases due to the tax policy changes during 2009-
11, we obtain these significant elasticities. They are most likely entirely driven by the 
mechanical increases in wealth due to the policy change. However, they might also pick up 
 
41 Due to simplification reasons, the lowest wealth tax rate (0.9%) was removed in 2009, leaving all taxable 
wealth taxed at 1.1%. Regardless, this had minor effects on what people paid in wealth tax because of the 
increased threshold (Ministry of Finance 2008). 
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behavioral responses. Households might be motivated to scheme their taxable wealth when 
faced with this significant increase in wealth and potential tax liability.  
While most of the adjustments come simultaneously with the changes in tax valuation of 
housing (2010), we see a smaller effect in 2011. Given that the 2010 threshold is low 
compared to the following years, many households experienced an increased tax liability, also 
shown in Figure 5. Fortunately, after the effects of the tax policy changes during 2008-11 
have died down. Our instrument is stable with non-significant estimates in the two pre-reform 
years, 2012-13. The policymakers did not make extensive changes in those two years, with 
only a slight increase in the threshold, valuation of secondary housing, and business 
properties. 
 
Following the above discussion, we will argue for the validity of our second regression 
specification (6). Even though our model picks up two pre-reform estimates, we keep in mind 
that our treatment group (most likely) experienced these exogenous increases in wealth by the 
changed housing valuation. This does not, arguably, invalidate our findings; it only shows that 
it is hard to isolate responses to one particular reform in a dynamic tax environment.  
 
6.3 Robustness Check  
 
Table 8: Robustness Check of the Second Specification (6) 
 (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
    Two Groups   
    
Mean Income > 100k  Mean Wealth > 50k   Mean Wealth > 100k   
   
    
 
𝑇#𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟$ 
    
    
    
 -0.0224***   
    
    
    
-0.0328***   
    
    
    
 -0.0472***   
    
    
    
 -0.0816***   
 
    
10-piece spline for Wealth   
10-piece spline for Income   
Age splines 
Household/Time fixed effects   
    
R-Squared   
Nr of Observations   
          (0.00449)   
    
YES   
YES   
YES 
YES   
    
0.0878  
13 237 576   
    
    
(0.0049)   
    
YES   
YES   
YES 
YES  
    
0.0923   
11 514 696   
    
(0.0048)   
    
YES   
YES   
YES 
YES  
    
0.0985   
11 646 352   
(0.0051)   
    
YES   
YES   
YES 
YES   
    
0.104  
10 772 552 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 8 present the robustness check of the main result from Table 7 Panel A. In (1), we 
choose to only focus on two treatment intensity groups instead of three. Those with taxable 
wealth above the 2014 threshold and below the 2015 thresholds receive a -1 percentage point 
change in their wealth tax rate. Those individuals constitute 5.49 percent of the observations. 
Instead of removing those individuals, we place them in the control group. The intuition is to 
have a more stable treatment group, those above both 2014 and 2015 thresholds, and subject 
to the wealth tax in both years. Placing them in the control group makes little impact on our 
estimate; it coincides with our main results. Because this group consists of few households, 
our estimates are no surprise.  
 
In the spirit of Weber (2014), we choose to increase the cutoffs of inclusion. From regression 
(2), we see that a cutoff based on average income does not change our findings to a large 
degree. We see a slightly larger effect than our main results, significant at the 1 percent level. 
We still exclude those with average taxable wealth below zero. The motivation by setting an 
income cutoff is to exclude those who do not have the opportunity, arguably, to change their 
behavioral responses to wealth taxation by their income. These might be financially passive 
individuals, people who have inherited wealth or are widower/widows. We obtain a slightly 
larger effect when excluding this group, an elasticity w.r.t net-of-tax rate of 3.28 (p<0.01). 
  
In (3) and (4), we choose to set the wealth cutoff higher. In both cases, we obtain larger 
estimates, significant at the 1 percent level. The motivation is to observe the sensitivity of our 
model to other cutoff limits. While regression (3) is still in line with our main findings, 
regression (4) suggests a more significant effect than initially obtained. This might indicate 
that our main results underestimate the effects. When we compare a treatment and control 
group even more similar in terms of wealth, the effect increases. However, this specification 
does not yield as credible results as our main findings in an event study. By setting the cutoff 
higher, those in the treatment group are still the same. Nevertheless, the control group might 
be more unstable. They are closer to the yearly thresholds early in the period. Meaning, they 
might have been subjected to wealth tax when the threshold was lower than in 2014-15, 
making them unfit to be a control group. We argue that this cutoff is too high, given that we 
use average taxable wealth. Moreover, when including those with taxable wealth above zero 
and below 100 kNOK, the responses of those with taxable wealth above 100 kNOK and 




After working empirically with the effects of wealth tax policies, we especially learned that it 
is hard to define the correct regression specification. Even though the literature offers 
concrete guidelines on dealing with the various issues that might arise, the transferability is 
not always obvious. In the first Diff-in-Diff estimation (3), we decided to include individuals 
who might have had negative taxable wealth in one or more years, but not all. In other studies, 
the cutoff was usually set around 10 000 euros or 10 000 dollars. In our case, this would have 
been more feasible if we worked with a shorter period. We argued that removing individuals 
who received treatment in the tax reform of 2014-2015 because of negative taxable wealth in 
prior years would go against its purpose. However, based on Diff-in-Diff regression (6) and 
the robustness check, we see that the model is sensitive to other cut-offs. Also, the persistence 
of taxable wealth above the yearly thresholds.  
 
We recognize that our research has more limitations that might affect our estimates. We do 
not include the top 1.5 percent of the wealthiest part of the population. This was a choice 
made by NoCET and is due to privacy concerns regarding identifying individuals by their 
financial composition. Our households paid on average 6700 NOK in wealth tax in 2009; this 
increased to 8250 NOK in 2016. The official numbers from the Ministry of Finance (2020a) 
are approximately 25 000 NOK in 2009 and 30 000 NOK in 2016. Our findings point to a 
small but significant effect of an increase in the wealth tax rate. This may be because the 
households, on average, do not pay a considerable amount of tax in our sample. The 
wealthiest households might have better access to lawyers and accountants, helping them 
scheming their taxable wealth. We are convinced that if we had this group in our data set, 
then the elasticities would be more extensive, as suggested by the findings of Zoutman (2018) 
and Jakobsen et al. (2020). Nevertheless, we would still be unable to separate real behavior 
from avoidance and evasion. 
 
Our empirical strategy does not take into consideration those individuals in the pursuit of 
making a fortune. We do not identify the effect on entrepreneurs and those in liquidity 
restrained situations. We neither include those who have emigrated because of the wealth tax.   
Ernst Ravnaas investigated capital flight by wealthy Norwegians, and wealth taxation was 
decisive as to why some chose to emigrate (Fasting 2016). 
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In our long-run panel, we only have two subsequent years after the reform. Preferably, since 
policymakers are mainly interested in the long-run effect of taxation policy, it would have 
been beneficial with more than two years post-reform. Because of the slow-moving nature of 
wealth accumulation and the time it takes for households to adjust to the new tax 
environment, we think the long-run effects would be more considerable. These tendencies are 
evident in various countries (Jakobsen et al. 2020; Brülhart et al. 2019; Zoutman 2018; 
Durán-Cabré, Esteller- Moré, and Mas- Montserrat 2019; Agrawal, Foremny and Martinez-

















8 Conclusion  
The aim of this thesis was to investigate the causal relationship between wealth taxes on 
wealth accumulation and savings. We were interested in making a contribution to this nascent 
field within the distortionary effects of wealth taxation. There have been various studies from 
foreign countries, but only one focused on this particular issue in Norway. Quantifying these 
behavioral responses to taxation is vital for policymakers to determine optimal taxation 
policies that lead to minimal efficiency loss. In most countries, an increase in the wealth tax 
rate reduces reported taxable wealth. Either by changed reporting behavior or by avoidance 
through investing in favorable assets. There is also evidence for strong migration responses 
within countries with inter-regional tax variation. Ring’s (2020) study of behavioral responses 
to the Norwegian wealth tax indicated a positive relationship. Households save when faced 
with a wealth tax liability. We were surprised by this finding, considering the estimates from 
other countries, and it motivated us to make an additional contribution from Norway. 
 
Our findings contradict the findings of Ring (2020). Similarly, as in foreign studies, we find a 
negative relationship between an increase in the wealth tax rate and savings/reported taxable 
wealth. However, as there are significant differences between Ring’s (2020) methodology and 
ours, we cannot separate real behavior from avoidance. Still, our findings are of particular 
interest to the Norwegian policymakers because they might signal a shifting of wealth 
towards tax-favorable assets, as well as reduced savings.  
 
We find small but significant distortive effects of wealth taxation. Notably, the Norwegian 
wealth tax is less distortive compared to wealth taxes in countries outside Scandinavia. The 
findings may indicate that in Scandinavian countries with mostly third-party reporting, 
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